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Abstract 
 
Should we require companies to report the same amount of 
income to the IRS as they report to their shareholders?  The idea 
behind “book/tax conformity” is that managers’ desire to increase 
reported earnings would act as a check on their desire to minimize 
taxable income, and vice versa.  Some scholars have proposed a 
comprehensive approach, adopting financial income as the basis 
for corporate taxation.  Legislators, meanwhile, have offered a 
targeted approach that singles out equity compensation, which has 
historically been a significant source of the “gap” between book 
income and taxable income. 
 
This Article argues that book/tax conformity carries 
unexplored costs that reduce its attractiveness, at least in the 
context of equity compensation (and quite possibly in other areas 
as well).  Conforming the employer’s tax treatment of stock and 
options with the accounting rules creates a paradox for employee-
level taxation.  Either employee taxation is also conformed to 
book, which raises liquidity, fairness, and other concerns, or we 
must diverge from section 83(h), which limits the employer’s 
deduction to the amount included by the employee as income.  
Severing this link between the employer’s deduction and the 
employee’s inclusion would eliminate an important check on tax 
gamesmanship that is analogous to the check that book/tax 
conformity proponents seek to create.  Conforming tax deductions 
for options with book, in other words, may simply trade one form 
of gamesmanship for another. 
 
More broadly, book/tax conformity must be evaluated in light 
of (1) the cost of other gamesmanship that may result from 
conformity, (2) the availability of other means of combating 
manipulation, (3) potential distortions in compensation design, 
and (4) effects on the decision to be a private or public company.  
We conclude that equity compensation should be excluded from 
comprehensive book/tax conformity regimes, and one-off 
proposals to conform employer taxation of stock and options with 
book are probably misguided.  On the other hand, we suggest that 
if targeted conformity of equity compensation is desired, revising 
the accounting rules for options to match those of stock 
appreciation rights, which would yield conformity at the tax end 
of the spectrum, possibly could improve upon the status quo. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The idea of harmonizing the corporate income tax and financial 
accounting systems is alluring, as it would simultaneously place a check 
on two types of wasteful gamesmanship.  Managers could massage the 
books to maximize reported earnings, or they could scheme to minimize 
taxable income, but at least they could not do both at the same time.  
Instead, gamesmanship would result in a cost in terms of either reported 
earnings or taxable income.   
 
 Scholars and legislators have offered both comprehensive and 
targeted book/tax conformity proposals.  Comprehensive proposals, such 
as that suggested by Professor Desai, generally advocate using reported 
earnings as the base for corporate taxation with a few specific 
modifications to preserve certain tax preferences, such as accelerated tax 
depreciation.1  Most recently, Professor Shaviro has proposed a 
comprehensive book/tax conformity plan that would increase corporate 
taxable income by 50% of the difference between a firm’s book income 
and its taxable income computed without the adjustment.2  Other 
proposals3 are targeted more narrowly at equity compensation, a 
particular non-conforming item that has historically accounted for the 
largest chunk of the book/tax “gap.”4 
                                                 
1 See Mihir A. Desai, The Degradation of Reported Corporate Profits, 19 J. ECON. 
PERSP. (2005); Mitchell L. Engler, Corporate Tax Shelters and Narrowing the 
Book/Tax “GAAP,” 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 539; Celia Whitaker, Bridging the 
Book-Tax Accounting Gap, 115 YALE L.J. 680 (2005); George K. Yin, Getting Serious 
About Corporate Tax Shelters:  Taking a Lesson from History, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 209 
(2001). 
2 Daniel Shaviro, The Optimal Relationship Between Taxable Income and 
Financial Accounting Income: An Analysis and a Proposal (NYU Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 07-38, Feb. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017073 
(proposing that taxable income of large public corporations be adjusted by 50% of the 
positive difference between an adjusted earnings figure and taxable income as 
otherwise determined). 
3 See Ending Corporate Tax Favors for Stock Options Act, S. 2116, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (bill introduced by Senator Levin on Sept. 28, 2007 that would limit corporate 
tax deductions for stock options to the amount recognized as an expense in financial 
statements); Executive Stock Options: Should the IRS and Stockholders Be Given 
Different Information?: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of 
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of 
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs) [hereinafter Levin 
statement]; Mihir A. Desai, Tax, Accounting Treatment of Stock Options Should Be the 
Same, 115 TAX NOTES 1301 (2007) (reprinting testimony presented at the 
subcommittee hearing chaired by Senator Levin). 
4 See Mihir A. Desai, The Divergence Between Book and Tax Income, 17 
NBER/TAX POL’Y & ECON. 169, 180 (2003) (finding that stock option exercise 
accounted for the largest component of the gap between book and tax income in the 
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The book/tax “gap” associated with equity compensation and other 
items results from the fact that tax and accounting systems travel on 
different tracks.  The timing and amount of the tax deduction taken by 
an employer for compensation delivered in the form of stock options or 
restricted stock differs from the expense recorded for financial reporting 
purposes.5  The book/tax “gap” for option compensation has narrowed 
considerably in recent years, as a new financial accounting rule (SFAS 
123R) requires the fair value of options to be expensed over the option 
vesting period.6  Nonetheless, the measurement of equity compensation 
expense for financial accounting purposes remains separate and distinct 
from the tax calculation.   
 
Book/tax conformity proponents note that the failure to use a single 
measure of compensation expense allows firms to game the system:  
they can artificially inflate accounting earnings without suffering a 
corresponding increase in taxes.  Likewise, they can shelter income from 
tax without taking a hit to earnings.7  Because firms generally wish to 
report high income to investors but low income to the IRS, conforming 
employer-level book and tax treatment would provide a check on abuses 
of both reporting systems.8  
                                                                                                                            
late 1990s); see also, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, 
APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 101 (White Paper, Dec. 20, 2007) (concluding that “while full 
[book/tax] conformity might not be an appealing template for business tax reform, 
policymakers should keep in mind the potential simplification benefits of more targeted 
conformity”). 
5 See infra Part II.A. 
6 See FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
NO. 123 (REVISED 2004) [hereinafter SFAS 123R].   
7 See Desai, supra note 1, at 171-192; Engler, supra note 1; Whitaker, supra note 
1, at 691-93; Yin, supra note 1, at 25; Shaviro, supra note 2, at 24.  A related concern 
of some commentators is that in recent years aggregate tax deductions for option 
compensation have far exceeded the aggregate expense reported to investors.  See 
Levin statement, supra note 3.  However, as discussed infra, gaming aside, there 
should be no bias between the expected values of options, which are recorded as an 
expense, and their realized values, which are deducted for tax purposes.  Thus, it is not 
obvious that we should be concerned about book/tax differences aside from the gaming 
potential. 
8 See, Desai, supra note 1, at 190 (noting that closer book/tax conformity will 
reduce managers’ opportunities to abuse discrepancies between the two systems); 
Engler, supra note 1, at 545-49 (noting that comprehensive book/tax conformity might 
reduce abuses, but concluding that such a proposal is unacceptably overbroad); 
Shaviro, supra note 2, at 4 (“Absent our two-book system . . . corporate executives 
would often be forced to choose between the earnings management goal of increasing 
reported income and the tax planning goal of reducing it, rather than being able, in 
many cases, to enjoy the best of both worlds”); Whitaker, supra note 1, at 697 (“By 
linking the consequences of tax and book reporting, a unified system could make such 
abusive accounting more painful and less attractive. If any increase in reported book 
income also meant increased tax liability, or if intended tax losses had to appear in 
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This Article argues that book/tax conformity carries unexplored 
costs that reduce its attractiveness as a policy prescription, at least in the 
context of equity compensation (and quite possibly in other areas as 
well).  Conforming the employer’s tax treatment of stock and options 
with the accounting rules creates a paradox for employee-level taxation.  
Either employee taxation is also conformed to book, which yields grant 
date taxation and raises liquidity, fairness, and other concerns; or else we 
must deviate from section 83(h), which limits the employer’s deduction 
to the amount included by the employee as income.  Severing the link 
between the employer’s deduction and the employee’s income would 
eliminate a check on tax gamesmanship that is analogous to the check 
that book/tax conformity proponents seek to create.  Simply conforming 
employer tax deductions for equity to book, in other words, may trade 
one form of gamesmanship for another. 
 
 More broadly, book/tax conformity must be evaluated in light of (1) 
the cost of other gamesmanship that may result from book/tax 
conformity, (2) the availability of other means of combating 
manipulation, (3) potential distortions in compensation design, and (4) 
effects on the decision to be a private or public company.  We conclude 
that equity compensation should be excluded from comprehensive 
book/tax conformity regimes.  Similarly, one-off proposals to conform 
employer taxation of stock and options with book are misguided, at least 
as currently proposed.  On the other hand, we show that adjusting the 
accounting treatment for stock options to mirror that of stock 
appreciation rights would conform option book treatment to tax, largely 
accomplish the goals of those advocating reform, and avoid the pitfalls 
associated with option conformity at book.  If politically feasible, this 
alternative could represent an improvement over the status quo. 
 
 This Article is organized as follows.  In Part II, we review the 
relevant tax and accounting rules and the gaming incentives they create.  
In Part III, we analyze the pros and cons of book/tax conformity as it 
relates to equity compensation.  Part IV concludes. 
 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
financial statements, the tradeoff would induce corporations to be cautious in reporting 
to investors and would likely increase the amount of income reported to the IRS”); Yin, 
supra note 1, at 227 (noting that using book earnings as the starting point for federal 
taxation mitigates the incentive to abuse ambiguities in the tax code, but arguing that 
accounting abuses and gaming would remain). 
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We begin with a brief review of the current accounting, tax, and 
disclosure rules applicable to equity compensation.  We then consider 
why these rules matter to managers and businesses, why firms might 
manipulate the rules to over- or under-report compensation, and how 
conformity might mitigate gaming.    
 
 
A.  Accounting, Tax Treatment, and Disclosure under the Current Rules 
 
 
1.  Financial Accounting for Equity Compensation 
 
 Ideally, financial accounting for stock, stock options, other equity 
compensation instruments, and cash compensation should be consistent, 
as each of these items reflects a cost of employee services.  In the eyes 
of most commentators, the current financial accounting rules largely 
achieve that goal.  Importantly, the anomalous treatment of stock options 
was rectified by the Financial Accounting Standard Board’s (FASB’s) 
adoption of SFAS 123R in 2004.  But SFAS 123R did not fix 
everything:  a significant disparity between the accounting treatment of 
options and economically equivalent stock appreciation rights still 
remains. 
 
 Stock options.  Since 2005, public companies have been required to 
expense the expected value of options provided to employees as 
compensation.9  Under the current accounting standard, companies must 
first calculate the fair value of options as of the date of grant using the 
Black-Scholes, binomial, or other appropriate option pricing model.10  
Then, they must ratably record this amount as an expense over the 
vesting period of the option.11  Under GAAP in force prior to 2005, no 
expense had to be recorded with respect to standard options issued at or 
                                                 
9 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6.  Technically, companies are required to recognize 
the cost of compensation.  Generally, that cost will be recognized as an expense, but in 
some situations firms are required to capitalize compensation cost.  See id. ¶ 5 & n.5.  
For simplicity, we will assume the former and speak throughout of “expensing” 
compensation cost. 
10 Conceptually, the fair value of an option is the price that would be achieved in 
an arm’s length exchange.  See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ A7.  However, while 
vesting requirements would obviously affect the market value of an option, SFAS 
123R instructs firms to calculate fair value ignoring vesting restrictions.  See SFAS 
123R, ¶ A9.  Vesting is accounted for separately by recognizing compensation cost 
only for options that ultimately vest.  See id. 
The following information is required to calculate option value: market price of 
the stock as of the date of measurement, exercise price of the option, expected time to 
exercise, estimated volatility, the risk-free rate of return, and the expected rate of 
dividends.  See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (8th 
ed. 2006). 
11 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ 16-20, 39-49.   
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out of the money,12 although between 1995 and 2005 firms that failed to 
voluntarily expense options were required to provide pro forma earnings 
statements in the footnotes to their financial reports that did include 
option expense.13  Despite lingering questions about the suitability of 
using existing option pricing models, which were designed to value 
short-term tradable options, to value long-term, non-tradable employee 
stock options, the FASB and most commentators agree that the current 
accounting treatment for employee options represents a vast 
improvement over the prior regime and is reasonably consistent with 
accounting for cash compensation.14   
 
Restricted Stock.  The accounting treatment for restricted stock is 
roughly consistent with that of cash compensation.  The compensation 
value of restricted stock as of the date of grant is expensed over the 
vesting period of the stock.15   
 
SARs.  Stock appreciation rights (SARs) are economically equivalent 
to stock options, but they are settled in cash, or in cash or stock at the 
employee’s or employer’s option.16  Under SFAS 123R, cash-settled 
SARs are treated as liabilities, rather than equity instruments.  As such, 
their realized value, rather than their expected value, is ultimately 
                                                 
12 See ACCT. PRINCIPLES BD., OPINION NO. 25, ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED 
TO EMPLOYEES (1972) [hereinafter APB 25].  Under APB 25, only the intrinsic value 
of an option – the degree to which an option was in the money – at the date of grant 
was recognized as an expense.  There were exceptions, however.  For example, an 
option issued at the money with an exercise price indexed to the market or an at-the-
money option that vested only if certain performance targets were achieved would have 
resulted in an accounting expense.  See FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., EXPOSURE DRAFT: 
ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION ¶ 66-67 (June 30, 1993).  SFAS 
123R eliminated accounting-induced preferences for particular option designs.  
13 FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 
123 (1995) [hereinafter SFAS 123]. 
14 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, Appendix B (discussing the bases for the FASB’s 
decision to mandate fair value accounting for options); infra Part III.B.1.a (discussing 
why option pricing models imperfectly value employee stock options).  
15 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ 21, 39-49.  
For the uninitiated, restricted stock is stock that is provided to an employee at no 
explicit cost or at a discount to the market price, but is nontransferable and forfeitable 
up until a specified vesting date.  See Judith E. Alden & Murray S. Akresh, Using 
Equity to Compensate Executives, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 67, 82 (Yale D. 
Tauber & Donald R. Levy eds., 2002).  The amount expensed is the full value of stock 
that is granted at no explicit charge to the employee or the discounted amount for any 
bargain sales of stock to employees.  Restricted stock granted to employees of public 
companies generally involves no explicit charge to the employee.  This will be our 
assumption in the analysis that follows, although the analysis of bargain sales is 
analogous. 
16 See Alden & Akresh, supra note 15, at 98. 
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expensed.17  In brief, firms issuing SARs also utilize an option pricing 
model to initially value the units, but they are required to update their 
valuations and modify expense recognition between the dates of grant 
and exercise.  As a result of marking these units to market, the 
cumulative amount expensed equals the amount realized by the 
employee on exercise.18  
 
2.  Tax Treatment 
 
 The taxation of equity compensation arrangements begins with IRC 
§ 83.  That section provides the baseline rule that property received in 
exchange for services is treated as ordinary income when the property is 
received.  Because of valuation and liquidity concerns, however, 
recognition is often deferred for tax purposes until a realization event 
occurs, such as the exercise of a stock option or the vesting of a 
contractual right to sell one’s stock.   
 
 ISOs.  The tax treatment of stock options depends on whether the 
options qualify as incentive stock options (ISOs).  A limited number of 
ISOs can be granted each year to each employee.19  If holding period 
and other requirements are met, the employee is not taxed until the stock 
received on exercise of the ISO is disposed of, and the entire gain is 
taxed at long term capital gains rates.20  In this case, the employer 
receives no tax deduction.21   
 
 NQSOs.  Although important in certain industries, such as the 
technology sector, ISOs are estimated to account for only about 5% of 
option grants.22  We will focus here instead on non-qualified stock 
                                                 
17 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ 28-38.  SAR treatment also applies to tandem 
awards of stock options and SARs that provide the recipient with a choice of exercising 
the option or the SAR, but not both.  See id. ¶ A198-A200. 
18 See infra Part III.C.1 for an example of SAR accounting.  
19 The grant date fair market value of shares underlying ISOs that first become 
exercisable by an employee in any year may not exceed $100,000.  IRC § 422(d). 
20 To qualify for ISO tax treatment, the shares may not be sold within one year of 
option exercise or two years of the option grant.  See IRC § 422(a).  It is important to 
note, however, that the spread on an ISO at exercise (the difference between the then 
fair market value of the shares and the exercise price) is an adjustment for purposes of 
computing alternative minimum tax.  See IRC § 56(b)(3). 
21 See IRC § 421(a)(2). 
22 See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive 
Compensation, 14 NBER/TAX POL’Y & ECON. 7 (2000).  Not only are ISO grants 
limited under the Code, at current tax rates they are generally not tax efficient for 
profitable firms.  From a global, i.e., employer plus employee, tax perspective, ISOs 
are tax preferred only when the present value of the employee’s tax savings from ISO 
treatment exceeds an employer’s NQSO deduction.  At current top rates of 35% for 
both corporate income and personal income, even a low 15% rate on long term capital 
gains does not favor ISO qualification.  See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND  
BUSINESS STRATEGY 229 (3d ed. 2005).  
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options (NQSOs), which make up a much larger share of corporate 
compensation.  A recipient of a NQSO recognizes ordinary income 
equal to the spread at exercise, i.e., the difference between the market 
price of the stock at the time of exercise and the strike price of the 
option.23  The employer is entitled to a deduction in an amount equal to 
the income recognized by the employee.24  In other words, the tax 
consequences to both the employee and the employer are based on the 
realized value of the options.25 
 
 Restricted Stock.  Absent a § 83(b) election, a recipient of restricted 
stock granted at no explicit cost recognizes ordinary income in an 
amount equal to the fair market value of the stock when it vests.26  
Again, the employer is entitled to a deduction of the same amount at the 
same time.27  If the employee makes a § 83(b) election, the employee 
includes the fair market value of the stock as ordinary income at the date 
of grant, without regard to any restrictions.  The employer receives a 
matching deduction.   
 
 SARs.  The tax treatment of cash-settled SARs effectively mirrors 
that of NQSOs.  The cash received on exercise is recognized as ordinary 
income, and the employer is entitled to a matching deduction.28 
 
 The tax advantage of equity compensation.  Even when the matching 
principle applies, the tax treatment of equity compensation is not 
perfectly consistent with the taxation of cash or grant date taxation of 
unrestricted stock grants.  Because corporations are not taxed on 
investments in their own equity, employers are able to hedge their equity 
compensation obligations in such a way as to effectively exempt the 
investment returns on NQSOs and restricted stock from taxation.  
                                                 
23 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a). 
24 See I.R.C. § 83(h). 
25 This analysis assumes that option grants do not run afoul of recently enacted 
IRC § 409A, which accelerates taxation and imposes penalties and interest on 
employees participating in deferred compensation plans that do not meet certain 
requirements.  Options are generally subject to § 409A, but NQSOs granted at the 
money are exempted.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(A).     
26 IRC § 83(a).  Restricted stock is not subject to § 409A.  See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.409A-1(b)(6)(i). 
27 IRC § 83(h). 
28 See Rev. Rul. 80-300, 1980-2 C.B. 165 (holding that possession of SARs does 
not produce constructive receipt and that the employee-recipient includes the amount 
received on exercise in gross income in that year).  From an employer’s perspective, 
cash-settled SARs are considered deferred compensation.  The timing of deduction is 
thus controlled by IRC § 404(a)(5).  SARs are exempted from § 409A on the same 
basis as NQSOs.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(A). 
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However, the extent to which these arrangements are tax advantaged 
(relative to cash compensation) is subject to debate.29 
 
3.  Disclosure 
 
SEC regulations require detailed tabular disclosure in company 
proxy statements of the compensation of the most senior corporate 
executives.  The executives for whom disclosure is required are usually 
the CEO, CFO, and the three most highly compensated executives other 
than the CEO and CFO (collectively, the “named executives”).30   
 
Stock options and SARs received by these executives are reported in 
a belt-and-suspenders fashion intended to give shareholders a complete 
picture of executive compensation.  First, the amount of stock 
option/SAR compensation recognized as an expense each year for each 
executive is reported in the Summary Compensation Table, which is 
meant to provide a bottom line compensation figure for each named 
executive for each year.31  Thus, this table reflects the grant date value of 
options prorated over the vesting period.32  Second, for the year of 
issuance, the entire grant date value of an option/SAR is reported in a 
table labeled Grants of Plan-Based Awards.33  Third, the number of 
shares underlying outstanding options/SARs held by each named 
executive, as well as exercise price and expiration data, are reported 
                                                 
29 For example, if a firm issues restricted stock to an employee in lieu of cash 
compensation and uses the freed-up cash to repurchase its own shares, effectively 
hedging the equity compensation, it will not be taxed on the investment in its own 
equity per IRC § 1032.  Moreover, the investment return is not taxed to the employee, 
since the deferral of taxation on equity compensation is equivalent to exemption of 
investment returns.  As a result, the investment return goes wholly untaxed.  That 
exemption of investment return is advantageous if returns are positive, but 
disadvantageous if returns are negative.  However, depending on one’s assumptions 
regarding the impact of limitations on the deductibility of capital losses, the symmetry 
is broken and equity compensation can be significantly advantaged.  See David I. 
Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 695, 755-57 
(2004) (synthesizing the employee and employer taxation of equity compensation); 
Michael S. Knoll, The Tax-Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation, 103 TAX NOTES 
203, 214 (2004) (finding that “over a range of circumstances” equity compensation is 
tax advantaged); see also Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time 
Value of Money,” 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986) (seminal article on time value issues and 
taxation, including consideration of the tax efficiency of deferred compensation); but 
see Ethan Yale, Investment Risk is Important When Assessing the Tax Benefit of 
Deferred Compensation (working paper) (arguing in an analogous context that the tax 
benefit of deferral should be viewed as only the avoided after-tax cost of financing the 
resulting incremental investment). 
30 SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(2)-(3). 
31 SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)(2)(vi). 
32 The annual expense recognized for SARs is, of course, reported as well, 
although SARs are not expensed in the same way as options.  See supra Part II.A.1 and 
infra Part II.C.1.   
33 SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(d)(2)(viii). 
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annually in a separate table.34  Fourth, in the year of option/SAR 
exercise, the number of shares acquired and/or value realized are 
reported in still another table.35 
 
Restricted stock grants to the named executives are disclosed in an 
analogous fashion.  Prorated portions of grant date values and full grant 
date values are reported in the first two tables mentioned above.36  The 
value of outstanding unvested shares is reported in a separate table, as is 
the value of restricted stock realized on vesting.37  
 
The SEC has endeavored to develop a compensation disclosure 
regime that provides transparency and comparability.  With respect to 
traditional compensation – cash, stock, and options – it seems to have 
largely achieved that objective.  
 
 
B.  Behavioral Effects 
 
 
 The patchwork of accounting, tax, and disclosure rules affect the 
choices that managers make in how they pay themselves and their 
employees.  These rules affect the forms of compensation selected as 
well as the reporting choices made by managers. 
 
 Tax.  Firms and managers respond to tax incentives.  This behavior 
is unsurprising; taxes directly affect cash flows.  Tax minimization can 
be seen in a wide variety of business decisions, ranging from such 
fundamental issues as choice of location, organizational structure, and 
payout decisions, to more esoteric topics, such as the choice between 
compensating employees with ISOs or NQSOs.38   
   
 Accounting.  What’s more surprising, at least to academics, is the 
degree of managerial sensitivity to reported earnings.  Managers are 
sensitive to reported earnings even in cases in which their choices only 
superficially affect earnings, without affecting cash flows or the overall 
information provided to the market.39  Given the general view of 
                                                 
34 SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(f)(2). 
35 SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(g)(2). 
36 SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)&(d). 
37 SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(f)&(g). 
38 See infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
39 See David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior, 64 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 927, 949-65 (2007) (surveying empirical evidence on the effect of 
cosmetic accounting adjustments on corporate behavior). 
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economists that the markets see through cosmetic attempts to boost 
earnings,40 one might expect indifference to reported earnings as such.   
 
 But there are several reasons why managers care about reported 
earnings for their own sake.  First, the positive accounting literature has 
shown that in some cases, reported earnings matter independently of 
cash flow because debt obligations, covenants, and other contracts may 
be tied to reported earnings.  Given transaction costs, even cosmetic 
changes in earnings can affect the value of these contracts and thus 
shareholder value.41  Second, managers are particularly sensitive to one 
type of contract tied to reported earnings – executive compensation 
contracts.  Earnings-based bonuses may be affected by even cosmetic 
increases in reported income.42 
 
 Empirical data confirms managerial sensitivity to accounting rules 
and practices.  The evidence indicates that accounting choices vary 
systematically between firms, that corporations make operational 
changes in response to changes in accounting rules, and that firms 
sacrifice cash flows to boost reported earnings.43   
 
 Disclosure.  Assuming that there is some validity to the managerial 
power view of the executive pay setting process, we would expect public 
company executives to be particularly sensitive to the disclosure of their 
compensation in company proxy statements.  Under the managerial 
power model, executive pay is constrained in part by the outrage it 
produces among investors and the financial press.44  As a result, 
obfuscation and camouflage assist executives in achieving high levels of 
compensation, and enhanced transparency of disclosure is (for them) 
counterproductive.45 
                                                 
40 See ROSS L. WATTS & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY 
72-73 (1986). 
41 See id. at 133.  The general idea is that in the presence of transaction costs, both 
renegotiation of earnings-based contracts to adjust for cosmetic changes and failure to 
do so can be costly. 
42 See Walker, supra note 39, at 15-16, see also Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling 
Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 877, 923-24 
(2007) (arguing that IRC § 162(m), which disallows tax deductions for certain 
executive pay in excess of $1 million per year that is not performance based, 
encourages firms to adopt objective, formulaic bonus structures that can be 
manipulated through cosmetic adjustments to earnings). 
43 See Walker, supra note 39, Part II. 
44 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004); 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002). 
45 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 44; Bebchuk et al., supra note 44.  Many 
features of the current executive pay landscape appear to be more compatible with a 
managerial power view of executive pay than with an optimal contracting approach 
that views corporate boards bargaining at arms length with executives in a quest to 
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 Predicted Behavioral Effects.  Although we observe behavioral 
effects along each of these fronts, the degree of sensitivity varies 
according to the circumstances.  Managers of private companies are less 
focused on accounting and compensation disclosure than public 
company managers.  Private companies do not file proxy statements 
disclosing executive pay; nor are they generally required to file audited 
financial statements.  Because private companies often expect to go 
public or be acquired by public companies in the future, they retain some 
sensitivity to reported earnings, at least to the extent reflected in pro 
forma income statements and balance sheets.  Still, when tax, 
accounting, and disclosure motivations collide, private company 
managers can be expected to focus more on tax and cash flow rather 
than cosmetic accounting changes.  By contrast, public company 
managers are sensitive to each factor depending on the circumstances, 
with variance both from firm to firm and over time.  When executive 
compensation for senior executives at public companies is at issue, 
implicating both expense recognition and proxy disclosure, tax concerns 
(and the resulting cash flow implications) often take a back seat.   
 
 Given these sensitivities, the tax, accounting, and disclosure 
characteristics of various compensation devices affect their use.  There is 
both a first order distortion effect related to explicit differences in tax, 
accounting, or disclosure characteristics and a second order distortion 
effect related to susceptibility to manipulation. 
 
1.  First Order Distortion Effects 
 
 Tax, accounting, or disclosure rules that favor or disfavor a 
particular form of compensation distort companies’ compensation 
choices.  Unless distortions are purposefully created in order to 
overcome some market defect, these distortions should be expected to 
result in inefficient compensation arrangements.   
 
For example, prior to the promulgation of SFAS 123R, companies 
could design stock options to result in no expense against earnings.46  
Almost all options granted by public companies nominally satisfied 
these requirements and thus were “free goods” from an accounting 
perspective.47  This anomalous accounting treatment contributed to the 
                                                                                                                            
maximize shareholder value.  See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 44; Bebchuk et al., 
supra note 44. 
46 See APB Opinion 25, supra note 12.  Standard stock options that were granted at 
the money or out of the money did not result in any compensation expense. 
47 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ B31.  The “nominal” reference refers to the 
practice of backdating stock options to effectively grant in-the-money options while 
purportedly granting at-the-money options that did not have to be expensed.  See 
Victor Fleischer, Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, and Corporate Culture, 26 VA. 
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explosion in stock option compensation in the 1990s.  Empirical studies 
of broad-based option plans have concluded that the favorable 
accounting treatment of options drove their use,48 and anecdotal 
evidence suggesting a link is plentiful.49  Recent evidence indicates that 
SFAS 123R has resulted in a shift away from stock option 
compensation.50   
 
Similarly, differences in the tax treatment of incentive stock options 
and non-qualified options affect the use of these instruments.  
Depending on employer and employee tax rates, which have varied over 
time and vary from firm to firm based on circumstances, one or the other 
form of option will be tax advantaged once both employee and employer 
tax treatment are considered.  Empirical evidence shows that the use of 
ISOs is related to this relative tax advantage.51 
                                                                                                                            
TAX REV. 1031 (2007); David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis 
and Observations on the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561 (2007).  
48 See Steven R. Matsunaga, The Effects of Financial Reporting Costs on the Use 
of Employee Stock Options, 70 ACCT. REV. 1, 23 (1995) (finding a positive relationship 
between the use of options and other earnings management techniques and between 
option use and dividend constraints in an analysis of option grants at 123 companies 
over an eleven year period); Mary Ellen Carter et al., The Role of Incentives and 
Accounting in the Design of Executive Compensation Packages 24 (AAA 2005 FARS 
Meeting Paper, Aug. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=590841 (concluding 
as a result of a study of executive option grants reported in Standard & Poor’s 
ExecuComp database “that what is driving the use of options in non-CEO 
compensation is not the need to realign incentives, but the desire to avoid the 
expense”). 
49 See Walker, supra note 39, at 953-55 (reporting comments of Kevin Murphy 
and other executive compensation specialists). 
50 See Lawrence D. Brown & Yen-Jung Lee, The Impact of SFAS 123R on 
Changes in Option-Based Compensation (Working Paper, May 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=930818 (finding a 28% reduction in the proportion of senior 
executive pay comprised of options around the issuance of SFAS 123R and finding that 
reductions in option use were consistent with pre-SFAS 123R use of options to manage 
earnings). 
51 See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 231 (3d ed.  
2002) (surveying evidence and concluding that on an aggregate level the use of ISOs 
has varied consistently with the relative tax advantage). 
Although companies generally respond as expected to tax rules that affect 
compensation firm-wide, tax incentives directed at the executive suite do not always 
have the desired effect.  See, e.g., Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating 
Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence Chief Executive Officer 
Compensation, 20 J. LABOR ECON. S138 (2002) (concluding that IRC § 162(m) had 
little impact on executive compensation); Steven Balsam & Qin J. Yin, Explaining 
Firm Willingness to Forfeit Tax Deductions Under Internal Revenue Code § 162(m): 
The Million Dollar Cap, 24 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 300, 321-23 (2005) (finding 
forfeited tax deduction in 40% of firm-year observations and mixed evidence regarding 
the efficiency of those forfeitures); Polsky, supra note 42, at 881 (concluding that 
§ 162(m) has not effectively limited executive pay or improved executive incentive 
alignment); Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal? 21 
VA. TAX REV. 125, 136, 139 (2001) (noting a trend away from executive pay contracts 
capping golden parachutes to avoid losing corporate tax deductions and incurring 
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Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that as equity compensation 
disclosure requirements have been strengthened to increase transparency 
and comparability, more compensation has been channeled into less 
transparent modes, such as perks and supplemental retirement plans.52 
 
2.  Second Order Distortion Effects 
 
Even if tax, accounting, and disclosure rules are non-distortionary if 
fairly and honestly complied with, companies may prefer a particular 
form of compensation if those neutral rules allow sufficient leeway to 
generate favorable tax, accounting, or disclosure results.  The option 
pricing models currently employed for financial reporting and executive 
compensation disclosure (and proposed for tax) provide considerable 
scope for creative accounting.  Each of the major inputs into these 
models – stock price volatility, expected time to option exercise, and 
even the stock’s anticipated dividend yield – is subjective and 
manipulable.  Professor Mark Rubinstein has estimated that a firm 
seeking to overvalue options could reasonably select inputs and “report 
values almost double those reported by an otherwise similar firm 
seeking to undervalue its options.”53  Moreover, we have evidence that 
firms have manipulated the inputs into their option pricing models in 
such a way as to minimize the expense against earnings and the amount 
of executive compensation disclosed in proxy statements.54  For some 
companies, the ability to manipulate the valuation of options will be 
valuable, and as a result they will tend to favor option compensation 
relative to cash, restricted stock, and other compensation modes that do 
not allow for such manipulation.55 
                                                                                                                            
excise taxes to contracts “grossing up” executives for excise taxes on excess 
parachutes).  Apparently, when it comes to their own compensation, executives are 
more willing to overlook negative corporate tax implications. 
52 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 44, at 95. 
53 See Mark Rubinstein, On the Accounting Valuation of Employee Stock Options, 
2 J. DERIVATIVES 8, 17 (Fall 1995).  See also Maribeth Coller & Julia L. Higgs, Firm 
Valuation and Accounting for Employee Stock Options, 53 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 26, 31 
(1997) (concluding that the use of equally acceptable measurement techniques can 
produce surprisingly large differences in option values).  Note that the manipulability 
of option pricing models is an issue separate from their accuracy in valuing long-dated 
employee stock options.  Critiques of the accuracy of these models are discussed in 
Part III.B.1.a. 
54 See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Reporting Choice and the 1992 Proxy Disclosure 
Rules, 11 J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 497 (1996) (finding evidence that managers 
adopted option valuation methodologies that reduced footnoted compensation 
disclosures prior to the advent of SFAS 123R).  For more recent evidence, see the 
sources referenced in Part III.A.2. 
55 See Douglas A. Shackelford et al., A Unifying Model of How the Tax System and 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles Affect Corporate Behavior 30 (NBER 
Working Paper 12873, Jan. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=958436 
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C.  Book/Tax Conformity as a Restraint on Gamesmanship 
 
 
 Advocates of enhanced book/tax conformity point to the growing 
gap between the level of corporate income reported to investors (high) 
and to the Treasury (low).56  Although much of the gap arises from 
clearly identified book/tax differences, such as the treatment of stock 
options and depreciation, a significant fraction is mysterious.57  
Proponents argue that the lack of conformity provides firms with an 
incentive, or at least an opportunity, to inflate earnings and/or understate 
taxable income.58  For example, an entire class of tax shelters has been 
developed that exploits the gap to reduce taxes without reducing, and in 
some cases actually boosting, reported earnings.59 
                                                                                                                            
(arguing “that the attractiveness of a real decision depends on whether it expands the 
discretion of both book and tax accounting”). 
56 See Desai, supra note 4; Joann M. Weiner, Closing the Other Tax Gap: The 
Book-Tax Income Gap, 115 TAX NOTES 849, 850-51 (2007) (summarizing data from 
Charles Boynton et al., Distribution of Schedule M-1 Corporate Book-Tax Difference 
Data 1990-2003 for Three Large-Size and Three Industry Groups, 111 TAX NOTES 
177, 196 (2006), showing a general rise in the book-tax gap between 1990 and 2003). 
57 See Desai, supra note 4, at 169-70 (finding that more than half of the difference 
between book and taxable income for the largest US public companies for 1998 
($154.4 billion) was not attributable to depreciation, options, or foreign source income, 
the “traditional” sources of book/tax differences); cf., George A. Plesko, Corporate Tax 
Avoidance and the Properties of Corporate Earnings, 57 NAT’L TAX J., 729, 733 
(2004) (arguing that the Schedule M-1 book/tax reconciliation disclosure was so 
inadequate that “it is only possible to speculate on the magnitude of specific factors 
affecting the difference”).  In 2004, the IRS adopted a new book/tax reconciliation 
form, Schedule M-3, which should lead to an enhanced understanding of book/tax 
differences.  See Weiner, supra note 56.  
58 See Desai, supra note 3; Yin, supra note 1; Whitaker, supra note 1; Shaviro, 
supra note 2. 
59 A nice example, suggested to us by Gregg Polsky, who we thank, was Enron’s 
Project Condor.  Entered into in 1999 and as described by the Joint Committee on 
Taxation: 
Project Condor was structured to generate approximately $930 million of 
Federal income tax deductions without incurring any economic outlay.  In 
addition, because there was no corresponding financial statement expense, the 
tax savings associated with these deductions were anticipated to generate 
approximately $330 million after-tax financial statement income.  Enron 
intended to report the $330 million of financial statement income over the 
anticipated 16-year life of the structure, whereas the $930 million of Federal 
income tax deductions were not anticipated to be available to offset Enron’s 
taxable income until beginning in 2015. 
STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 
OF ENRON CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND 
COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 208 (Comm. Print 2003) 
(footnotes omitted).  See also, Desai, supra note 1 (describing efforts at Enron, Tyco, 
and Xerox to boost earnings through aggressive tax structuring).  
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The primary goals of book/tax conformity advocates are to reduce 
artificial earnings inflation, which interferes with efficient capital 
allocation, and to reduce tax sheltering, which burdens the public fisc.60  
A related goal is to increase the transparency of both reporting systems.  
Proponents generally envision using reported earnings as the baseline for 
corporate taxation (as opposed to conforming book to tax).  However, 
few commentators argue for 100% conformity.  Rather, proposals 
typically call for adopting accounting income as a default for corporate 
taxation, while permitting Congress to carve out deviations for tax 
accounting, such as accelerated tax depreciation.61      
 
Opponents of increased conformity point to the different purposes of 
the two systems, which suggests that using a single set of rules for both 
would be suboptimal.  For example, while clear, consistent, and easily 
administrable rules are needed to ensure fair distribution of the tax 
burden, flexibility in GAAP may allow firms to communicate 
information efficiently to investors.62 
 
Equity compensation has become a primary focus of the book/tax 
debate for two reasons.  First, because the old accounting rules created 
such a large gap between the book and tax treatment of options, options 
accounted for a large portion of the overall book/tax gap.63  The other 
reason is political: Although senior executives actually receive a small 
fraction of equity compensation grants, the narrative of wealthy 
executives manipulating the rules with respect to their own pay paints a 
striking picture of executive greed.   
 
                                                 
60 Theoretically, the burden on the fisc could be offset with higher tax rates, and 
our primary concern should be two resulting inefficiencies.  First, the resources 
expended by firms purely to shelter income from tax are wasted.  Second, higher 
marginal rates increase the deadweight losses from taxation, and in a non-linear 
manner.  See Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation, in 
1 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 74 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 
1985) (noting that the excess burden of a tax “increases with the square of the tax”).  
61 See Yin, supra note 1; Desai, supra note 1; Engler, supra note 1; Whitaker, 
supra, note 1; see also Shaviro, supra note 2 (proposing that taxable income of large 
public corporations be adjusted by 50% of the positive difference between an adjusted 
earnings figure and taxable income as otherwise determined). 
62 See Ronald A. Dye & Robert E. Verrecchia, Discretion vs. Uniformity: Choices 
Among GAAP, 70 ACCT. REV. 389, 390 (1995) (noting that accounting discretion may 
enhance comparability by allowing individual firms to select the most appropriate 
procedures under the circumstances).  The flip side, of course, is that managers may 
exercise the flexibility of GAAP to enhance perceived performance.  See id.  There are, 
however, other concerns with increased book/tax conformity including increased 
politicization of the financial accounting standard setting process, potential loss of 
congressional control over tax policy, and increased instability in tax and accounting 
rules.  See Walker, supra note 39, at 976-78.    
63 See Desai, supra note 4. 
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 Advocates of increased book/tax conformity for option 
compensation suggest that the temptation to under-report option 
accounting expense and over-report tax deductible expense may be 
mitigated by requiring firms to utilize the same figures for both 
purposes.64  If, as has been proposed,65 the tax deduction for options was 
limited to the amount expensed, these two conflicting forces would 
provide a check on over- or under-reporting.   
 
Companies undoubtedly take advantage of the book/tax discontinuity 
with respect to equity compensation to massage the books.  But it’s 
important not to overstate the opportunity for gamesmanship.  Not all 
compensation devices are equally manipulable.  Of the most important 
traditional compensation modes, the valuations of stock options and 
SARs are singularly manipulable.  Under current law, moreover, 
manipulation is largely confined to expense recognition and disclosure, 
even with respect to these instruments.  Expense recognition and 
executive compensation disclosure for options and SARs are based on 
values derived from option pricing models with subjective inputs, 66 
while taxation is based on realized gains.  Salary and bonuses ultimately 
are reported at realized value for tax and accounting purposes and are 
disclosed accordingly.  For public companies, there is little subjectivity 
in assessing the value of restricted stock granted to employees.  The fair 
market value of unrestricted stock serves as the measure of value for 
both book and tax purposes, and this value is transparent.      
 
 Moreover, as we argue below, the matching of employer and 
employee taxation plays a disciplining role that is similar to proposed 
book/tax conformity.  Generally, firms are entitled to a deduction for 
equity compensation in an amount equal to the income recognized by the 
employee.67  The tension between these two forces also provides a check 
on over- or under-reporting compensation. 
 
 If we include executive compensation disclosure, we actually have 
four forces at play that influence the desired magnitude of reported 
compensation.  Generally, three of these four favor minimizing reported 
compensation: expense recognition, executive compensation disclosure, 
and employee income recognition.  The employer-level tax deduction is 
the only one of these factors influencing firms to inflate reported 
compensation. 
 
 Of course, as suggested above, to the extent that accounting, 
employer and employee taxation, and compensation disclosure are 
                                                 
64 See Desai, supra note 3; Levin statement, supra note 3. 
65 S. 2116, 110th Cong. (2007). 
66 See Murphy, supra note 54 and accompanying text.  
67 See IRC § 83(h). 
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aligned, the balance struck by a firm that has the ability to manipulate 
compensation will depend on firm-specific factors.  Generally, however, 
we can predict that public companies will tend to be relatively more 
sensitive to accounting and compensation disclosure and private firms 
less so. 
 
 
III.  HARMONIZING BOOK AND TAX 
 
 
 With that background, we are now in a position to assess the pros 
and cons of conforming the book, tax, and disclosure rules for equity 
compensation.  We will compare the status quo regime with two 
approaches to creating conformity: revising tax rules to mirror GAAP 
and vice versa.  Our primary focus in Sections A and B will be on 
NQSOs and restricted stock.  As we will see in Section C, the tax and 
accounting treatment of SARs is already largely consistent. 
 
 
A.  Status Quo 
 
 
 As portrayed in the following table, under current rules, financial 
accounting for restricted stock and options is based on expected value, 
while employee and employer taxation are based on realized value.68   
 
Current Law:  
Measurement of NQSOs and Restricted Stock 
 
Financial Accounting Expected Value 
Employer Tax Realized Value 
Employee Tax Realized Value 
 
 
1.  NQSO Book/Tax Differences Absent Gamesmanship 
 
 Gaming potential aside, there is nothing inherently objectionable 
about basing accounting expense on expected value and compensation 
deductions on realized value.  Of course, the realized gain on any given 
option will almost always differ from the expected value calculated at 
grant.  But so long as the inputs to the option pricing model are fairly 
                                                 
68 Absent an election under § 83(b), taxation of restricted stock as compensation 
occurs at vesting, regardless of when the stock is ultimately sold.  Unlike the treatment 
of options, the Code treats vesting as a realization event for restricted stock.    
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estimated, there will be no bias one way or the other.69  In other words, 
over time and in aggregate, the amount of NQSO expense reported to 
investors in U.S. public companies should correspond with the 
deductions reported to the IRS.   
 
 Nonetheless, in a recent Senate subcommittee hearing, Senator Levin 
voiced concern regarding large differences in option expense reported to 
the IRS and investors.70  He highlighted recent IRS data pointing to a 
$43 billion difference between corporate tax deductions for options and 
reported accounting expense for returns for tax periods ending in the 
first half of 2005.  However, as Levin noted, SFAS 123R was not in 
effect at this point, so firms generally would have reported zero book 
expense for options granted in this period.71 
 
 In order to get an idea of the differences in option valuation post-
SFAS 123R, the subcommittee asked nine companies to calculate what 
the book expense would have been under the new accounting standard 
for executive stock options exercised between 2002 and 2006.  Levin 
reported that the firms’ tax deductions for these options was 575% larger 
than the corresponding “fair value” expense.72  However, this snapshot 
does not give an accurate view of the relationship between book and tax 
for three reasons.   
 
 First, by focusing on option exercise, the subcommittee introduced a 
“survivorship bias” into the analysis.  In order to glean meaningful data 
from a longitudinal study of this nature, one would have to take into 
account not just exercised options, but also options that expired 
unexercised and options still outstanding.   
 
 Second, many of the options analyzed were granted in the mid-1990s 
when stock prices were substantially lower than they were during the 
                                                 
69 To be sure, some commentators argue that option pricing models overstate the 
market value of long-dated options because these models unrealistically assume perfect 
liquidity.  See infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.  The presence of a market 
liquidity discount, however, does not suggest that a model is a biased estimator of 
expected value.  Other criticisms of the applicability of option pricing models to long-
dated options suggest only random errors.  See infra Part III.B.1.a. 
70 See Levin statement, supra note 3. 
71 See id.  The $43 billion figure comes from data reported on schedule M-3.  This 
schedule, which reconciles book and tax income, is required to be filed by public 
companies with assets in excess of $10 million.  For further discussion of the M-3 data 
from this period, see Executive Stock Options: Should the IRS and Stockholders Be 
Given Different Information?: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th 
Cong. 72 (2007) (written testimony of Kevin Brown, Acting Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue). 
72 See Levin statement, supra note 3. 
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early to mid-2000s, despite the market correction in 2001.73  Thus, a 
substantial potion of the book/tax difference observed reflects the bull 
market of the 1990s, not any inherent difference between the tax and 
financial accounting valuation methods.   
 
 Third, notes to the analysis prepared by the subcommittee staff 
explain that some of the options analyzed had been backdated.74  The 
staff instructed participating firms to calculate pro forma SFAS 123R 
expense under the assumption that these grants had not been backdated, 
i.e., assuming the grants had been made at the money on the actual grant 
date.  But these pro forma expense calculations were then compared to 
the actual tax deductions taken, although the lower backdated strike 
prices would have inflated the executives’ realized gains and the 
associated tax deductions.  This apples versus oranges comparison 
further contributed to the reported gap between the aggregate book and 
tax figures.75  In sum, it is hard to draw conclusions regarding potential 
biases between book and tax reporting for options from just a snapshot 
of historical data, and the methodology employed by the subcommittee 
staff simply does not provide a useful comparison. 
 
Acting IRS Commissioner Kevin Brown speculated in his testimony 
to the subcommittee that, in the wake of SFAS 123R, future Schedule 
M-3 differences for options should be “temporary in nature.”76  This 
means that while an option grant initially will result in expense 
recognition without a tax deduction, ultimately a corresponding tax 
deduction will be taken.  For NQSOs, Brown’s statement should be 
generally accurate over time and in the aggregate, reflecting the lack of 
any bias between the expected values of options expensed under SFAS 
123R and the realized values that determine employer tax deductions.  
Of course, it will not be true on a firm-by-firm basis.  Nonetheless, aside 
from gaming potential, it is difficult to see the importance of ensuring 
consistency between the accounting and tax expenses for options 
reported by particular firms for particular periods. 
                                                 
73 See Executive Stock Options: Should the IRS and Stockholders Be Given 
Different Information?: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of 
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 236-250 
(2007) (revealing that at each participating firm some of the options analyzed were 
granted in 1997 or before).  Between 1994 and 1998, the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
averaged about 6000 points.  The average for the 2002 through 2006 period was about 
10,000 points. 
74 See id. at 247. 
75 The appropriate comparison would have been between the actual tax deductions 
taken and the Black-Scholes values of the in-the-money options granted.  In other 
words, the prevailing market prices on the actual dates of the grants and the lower, 
backdated exercise prices should have been fed into the models.  Of course, even if 
backdating had been properly accounted for, the other two problems with the 
methodology would remain. 
76 Brown, supra note 71.  
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2.  NQSO Book/Tax Differences Due to Manipulation of Book 
Value 
 
The gaming potential, however, is a significant concern.  The lack of 
conformity between the book and tax treatment of options under current 
law removes one potential check against under-reporting of stock option 
expense and executive compensation by public companies.  The severity 
of the option expense under-reporting problem today is unknown.  
Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that companies manipulated 
the inputs into their option pricing models even prior to 2005, when 
option expense was only footnoted.77  Today, of course, the stakes are 
higher since option expense is now subtracted in arriving at the primary 
reported earnings figure.78 
 
As an example of the anecdotal evidence, the Wall Street Journal 
reported in 2003 that several companies were abandoning past practice 
of using five year average historical volatility data for their option 
pricing models in favor of forward-looking volatility estimates.79  Black-
Scholes option value is particularly sensitive to the volatility 
assumption, and this change had the effect of reducing reported option 
expense, and increasing footnoted, pro forma earnings.  However, 
market volatility was indeed significantly lower in 2003 than it had been 
in previous years,80 so perhaps the change was justified.  On the other 
hand, had there been a marked increase in market volatility in 2003, one 
may question whether these firms would have substituted higher 
estimated volatilities for historical volatility data. 
 
This suspicion is reinforced by empirical evidence provided by 
Bartov, Mohanram, and Nissim suggesting that firms opportunistically 
exploited the discretion in SFAS 123 to select volatility measures that 
would reduce reported compensation expense.81  They found that while 
                                                 
77 As noted above, although firms were not required to expense options prior to the 
FASB’s revision of SFAS 123 in 2004, since 1995 firms that did not voluntarily 
expense options were required to provide pro forma earnings statements in the 
footnotes to their financial reports that did include option expense.  See supra note 13 
and accompanying text. 
78 The potential for significant underreporting is apparent from theoretical work 
suggesting that, without departing from reasonable assumptions, a firm wishing to 
understate option expense could report values about one half those of an otherwise 
similar firm wishing to overstate values.  See Rubinstein, supra note 53, at 17. 
79 See Gary McWilliams, Dell Joins Wave of Companies Seeking to Soften Options 
Hit, Wall St. J., June 27, 2003, at C3.  SFAS 123 suggested that firms should take both 
historical and estimated volatility into account in calculating option values.  See SFAS 
123 supra note 13, ¶ 284-285. 
80 See McWilliams, supra note 79, at C3. 
81 See Eli Bartov et al., Stock Option Expense, Forward-Looking Information, and 
Implied Volatilities of Traded Options (Working Paper, Apr. 2004), available at 
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firms used both historical and implied volatility data in their models, the 
weight assigned to implied volatility was significant only when implied 
volatility was lower than historical volatility, in which case inclusion 
reduced option expense.82 
 
Other evidence of manipulation was reported by Hodder, Mayew, 
McAnally, and Weaver in a 2004 study.83  The authors compared the 
inputs firms used in calculating Black-Scholes values and concluded that 
a subset of firms were using the discretion provided by the accounting 
rules to reduce pro forma earnings.84    
 
 By contrast, in a study published in 2003, Balsam, Mozes, and 
Newman found little evidence of manipulation of overall option 
valuation.  However, they did find significant evidence of manipulation 
of the allocation of option expense over the vesting period to minimize 
first year impact.85  The authors speculated that the difference might 
have been attributable to greater transparency in the disclosure of the 
inputs to valuation than in the inputs to the allocation decision.86   
 
 However, it is important to reiterate that the stakes are higher today 
than they were when these studies were conducted.  Researchers may 
find even greater evidence of expense manipulation since SFAS 123R 
has taken effect.87 
                                                                                                                            
http://ssrn.com/abstract=510042.  SFAS 123 dictated the accounting treatment for 
options between 1995 and 2005. 
82 See id. at 3.  Using the Black-Scholes model, firms with market traded options 
can use actual trading information, including the prices of call and put options, 
duration, etc., to back into the stock price volatility that is implied by this market data.  
Obviously this data is not available for firms without market traded options. 
83 See Leslie David Hodder et al., Using Valuation Model Inputs to Manage 
Employee Stock Option Disclosures (Working Paper, Apr. 2004), available at 
http://www.usc.edu/schools/business/FBE/FEA2004/FEApapers/A-
S6_MLMcANALLY.pdf. 
84 See id., see also Murphy, supra note 54 (finding evidence that managers adopted 
option valuation methodologies that reduced footnoted compensation disclosures prior 
to the advent of SFAS 123R). 
85 See Steven Balsam et al., Managing Pro Forma Stock Option Expense under 
SFAS No. 123, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 31 (2003). 
86 See id.  Reporting companies were (and are) required to disclose in the footnotes 
to their financial statements all of the inputs used to calculate option value – grant date 
stock price, exercise price, volatility, expected life, the risk-free rate of return, and the 
expected rate of dividends.  With this information, a child (and most adults) could 
calculate the “fair value” of an option using an online option pricing calculator, such as 
the calculator found at http://www.option-price.com.  Allocation of this value across 
the service period also involves subjective inputs, such as the forfeiture rate of options 
and the timing and amount of deferred tax benefits.  These inputs were not required to 
be disclosed.  See id.   
87 Option backdating entailed less subtle manipulation of the inputs into option 
valuation models.  Backdating firms misrepresented the grant dates of options and 
hence the market price of the stock, which is a key input into option pricing models.  
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3.  NQSO Book/Tax Differences Due to Manipulation of Tax Value 
 
It is unlikely that the lack of book/tax conformity results in 
significant over-reporting of option expense for corporate tax purposes.  
Matching the employee’s inclusion with the employer’s deduction 
eliminates most of the net tax advantage of manipulation.  Companies 
with large tax losses might have an incentive to under-report option 
gains to reduce employee-level taxes, while firms providing options to 
employees whose marginal rates are less than 35% might have some 
incentive to inflate the gain amount.  But in cases in which employers 
and employees pay tax at or near the 35% marginal rate, there would be 
little or no net tax advantage to over- or under-reporting this 
compensation.88  Second, and perhaps more importantly, because option 
taxation currently is based on realized amounts, the opportunities to 
manipulate the deduction amount are quite limited even without the 
countering effect of inclusion and deduction.89 
 
4.  Restricted Stock: Book/Tax Differences 
 
The current book and tax rules applied to restricted stock are 
unlikely to generate significant book/tax differences.  Recall that the 
unrestricted value of stock at grant determines the book expense, while 
the fair market value at vesting controls taxation in the absence of a 
§ 83(b) election.  Upward drift in stock prices suggests that tax valuation 
may be slightly greater than book on average, but over the typical one to 
four year vesting period of restricted stock, that difference is likely to be 
trivial.  More importantly, for firms with publicly traded stock, 
manipulation opportunities are quite limited.90  Firms could minimize 
                                                                                                                            
Backdating certainly demonstrates a willingness to manipulate valuation.  However, 
although the effect of backdating was to reduce footnoted compensation expense and 
executive compensation disclosures, see Walker, supra note 47, the extent to which 
backdating was motivated by a desire to conceal compensation expense, versus 
boosting option values for recipients, is unclear.  See id.; Fleischer, supra note 47.  Of 
course, the revelation of backdating and SEC scrutiny could deter firms from 
manipulating option values to enhance earnings. 
88 The lack of a net tax advantage does not necessarily mean that firms will not 
respond to an advantage at the employee or employer level at the cost of the other.  We 
think it less likely that firms would shift tax costs onto rank and file employees who 
presumably are paid a market wage that would account for extraordinary taxes.  On the 
other hand, there is evidence of firms engaging in net inefficient tax behavior that 
provides benefits to senior executives.  See supra note 51. 
89 Option exercise dates could be backdated to over- or under-state gains at 
exercise.  However, evidence of exercise date backdating has been limited to situations 
in which backdating was used to under-state gains and reduce employee taxation.  See 
infra note 134 and accompanying text.  No evidence has been uncovered of exercise 
backdating to increase employer tax deductions. 
90 Firms without publicly traded stock that follow GAAP could manipulate 
compensation expense by underreporting the value of their stock. 
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compensation expense by backdating stock grants to low value periods, 
but doing so would likely have no affect on the value to recipients, so 
unlike stock option backdating, the driving force would be slight.91  
Moreover, absent a § 83(b) election, manipulation of tax valuation is 
impossible because vesting occurs on a fixed date determined several 
years in advance.92 
 
5.  Consistency Across Compensation Instruments 
 
Under current law, both the tax and accounting treatment of various 
compensation devices is relatively consistent.  As discussed above, the 
current system is not perfectly non-distortionary.  In some situations, the 
current combined employer and employee tax treatment creates a tax-
induced preference for equity compensation over cash.93  In addition, 
there is a troubling inconsistency in the accounting treatment of stock 
options and economically equivalent stock appreciation rights, with 
respect to which realized values ultimately determine compensation 
expense.94  The members of the FASB apparently recognized this 
situation, but decided that within the conceptual framework of GAAP, 
maintaining the distinction between equity transactions (option issuance) 
and assumption of liabilities (SAR grants) took precedence.95  However, 
even though the difference between stock option and SAR accounting is 
significant, any bias created is an order of magnitude smaller than the 
bias inherent in the pre-SFAS 123R treatment of stock options.96  The 
tax treatment of stock options and restricted stock and the accounting 
treatment of these two popular compensation devices are consistent and 
non-distortionary. 
 
                                                 
91 Backdating restricted stock grants would only be beneficial to recipients if they 
made a § 83(b) election or if the number of shares granted was a function of share 
price, i.e., if grants are based on value rather than a fixed number of shares. 
92 There is a tax game for private firms, but it does not flow from lack of 
conformity.  Private firms can convert ordinary income into capital gains for their 
employees by granting them restricted stock with low reported value.  The employees 
then make § 83(b) elections, paying tax at ordinary rates on the low reported value and 
taking a correspondingly low basis in the shares.  For the firm, the result is an 
equivalent low tax deduction, but for many private firms, particularly start ups with tax 
losses exceeding profits, this is a worthwhile tradeoff.  See Ronald J. Gilson & David 
M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for 
Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874 (2003) (arguing that tax gaming 
helps explain the issuance of convertible preferred stock, which can arguably justify a 
much higher per share value than common, to private equity investors). 
93 See supra Part I.A.2. 
94 See supra Part I.A.1. 
95 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6. 
96 Recall that pre-SFAS 123R firms could issue options with zero earnings cost.  
No other compensation device was free from an earnings perspective.  The post-SFAS 
123R treatment of options and SARs differs only in that the recognized expense 
reflects the expected value of the former and the realized value of the latter. 
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B. Conforming Tax to GAAP 
 
 
 Advocates of comprehensive book/tax conformity generally 
propose modifying the tax rules to match GAAP.97  This is also the 
approach put forward by those with specific proposals to conform the 
book and tax treatment of options.98  The effect of conforming tax rules 
to GAAP, as portrayed in the following table, would be to shift the 
employer’s tax deduction for non-qualified options and restricted stock 
from realized value to expected value.99 
 
 
Employer Tax Conformed to GAAP:  
Measurement of NQSOs and Restricted Stock 
 
Financial Accounting Expected Value 
Employer Tax Expected Value 
Employee Tax Expected or Realized Value? 
 
 
Basing the employer’s tax deduction on the reported accounting 
expense would reduce the incentive of firms to under-report option 
values for accounting and disclosure purposes.  But a difficult question 
arises with respect to employee taxation.  Would employees continue to 
be taxed based on the realized value of options, thus driving a wedge 
between employer and employee tax treatment?  Would employees also 
be taxed based on grant date expected values?  Or would employees be 
taxed on options at vesting, similar to the taxation of restricted stock?  
Each possibility raises troubling issues; employee taxation may even be 
the Achilles heel of these proposals to conform employer taxation of 
equity compensation to GAAP.100 
 
                                                 
97 See Yin, supra note 1; Desai, supra note 1; Engler, supra note 1; Whitaker, 
supra note 1. 
98 See Desai, supra note 3; Levin statement, supra note 3; S. 2116, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (proposing revision to IRC § 162 to provide that “the deduction … shall not 
exceed the amount the taxpayer has treated as an expense with respect to stock options 
… and shall be allowed in the same period that the accounting expense is recognized”).  
As drafted, Levin’s bill would apply to NQSOs, but not to restricted stock or SARs. 
99 Because SAR accounting is ultimately based on realized values, conforming 
SAR taxation to GAAP would affect the timing, but not the amount of employer 
deductions for SARs.   
100 Senator Levin’s bill would not alter the taxation of employees.  See S.2116, 
110th Cong. (2007); Press Release, Carl Levin, Summary of Ending Corporate tax 
Favors For Stock Options, S. 2116 Act, Sept. 28, 2007 (noting that the bill “[m]akes no 
change to stock option compensation rules for individuals.”). 
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1.  Conforming Employee Taxation of Equity Compensation to 
GAAP 
 
Suppose a firm issues an option to an employee with grant date value 
of $1 million and that the option vests in four years.  Per SFAS 123R, 
the company would recognize compensation expense of $250,000 for 
each of the four years between grant and vesting.101  Existing conformity 
proposals would allow the firm a $250,000 tax deduction for each of 
these years.  If the § 83 restriction were waived and employee taxation 
conformed as well, the employee would have ordinary income of 
$250,000 for each of these four years, and on the vesting date she would 
hold an option with tax basis of $1 million. 
 
At first glance, it might seem reasonable to tax employees on the 
grant date value of equity instruments received and to assess the tax on 
an accrual basis as the instruments vest.  After all, despite the risk of 
forfeiture, at the time of grant the employee has received a valuable right 
and experiences a contingent increase in net worth.  It is not clear 
whether the employee has income in a Haig-Simons sense; while the 
option is valuable, it cannot be transferred or exercised prior to vesting, 
making it unclear whether the right is a property right in the Haig-
Simons framework.102  Moreover, the restrictions on transfer and 
exercise make the valuation of the right subject to debate, 
notwithstanding the evolution of sophisticated pricing tools.  Still, there 
is no doubt that the option recipient is better off than her otherwise 
similarly situated colleague who receives no options.   
 
However, there are numerous practical and conceptual problems 
with conforming employee taxation of equity compensation to GAAP.  
Part of the problem relates to the difficulty of achieving individual tax 
equity in a world of ex ante stock and option tax valuation.  The 
potential for manipulation and avoidance creates a separate set of 
challenges.  
 
  a.  Valuation 
 
                                                 
101 This is not entirely accurate.  Firms recognize compensation expense only for 
equity instruments that vest.  Thus, the book expense for the first year would be 
reduced to reflect the firm’s estimated option forfeiture rate, and book expense in 
subsequent years would be adjusted as that estimate is revised.  See SFAS 123R, supra 
note 6, ¶ 43.  Forfeiture adjustments pose no difficulty for conforming employer tax to 
book, but they are obviously problematic for achieving complete conformity between 
book and employee tax.  This point is discussed below. 
102 See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938) (“Personal 
income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised 
in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between 
the beginning and the end of the period in question”). 
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 GAAP valuation of stock and options is a less than perfect measure 
of the cost of employee compensation and perhaps an inappropriate 
basis for taxing recipients.  The objective of GAAP option valuation is 
to estimate a firm’s opportunity cost in granting options – the price at 
which it could sell identical instruments on the market.103  But the 
methodologies used to value options were not designed for long-lived, 
non-transferable, compensatory options, and their adequacy in this 
service is highly contested.104  Critics of SFAS 123R point to several 
inadequacies in the models.  First, the models assume geometric 
Brownian motion in individual stock prices, i.e., a random walk, and the 
Black-Scholes model relies on an assumption of constant stock price 
volatility.105  Critics argue that these assumptions are not borne out by 
the data,106 and commentators have suggested that over the lives of 
typical employee stock options these assumptions may lead to 
significant valuation errors with respect to individual option grants.107   
 
 In addition, the option pricing models assume perfect liquidity, 
instantaneous arbitrage, and negligible transaction costs.108  Critics point 
out that liquidity in option markets diminishes with duration and argue 
that, even if markets in long-dated options existed, they would reflect 
                                                 
103 Or nearly identical.  As discussed supra note 101, firms are instructed to 
estimate values ignoring vesting requirements.  The effect of failure to vest is taken 
into account at the recognition stage.  
104 SFAS 123R does not specify a particular model for option valuation, listing the 
Black-Scholes and binomial models as being among the techniques that can be used in 
estimating fair value.  See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ A13. 
105 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ A15. 
106 Numerous studies have shown that U.S. stock prices do not follow random 
walks.  See, e.g., Ming Dong, Option Pricing with a Non-Zero Lower Bound on Stock 
Price, 25 J. FUTURES MARKETS 775, 776 (2005) (citing studies, but proposing a 
compensating adjustment to the Black-Scholes model).  It is generally accepted that 
stock price volatility will not remain constant over the life of a compensatory option.  
See, e.g., Charles Baril et al., Valuing Employee Stock Options under SFAS 123R Using 
the Black-Scholes-Merton and Lattice Model Approaches, 25 J. ACCT. EDU. 88, 95 
(2007).  Moreover, there is evidence that volatility is negatively correlated with stock 
price.  See Steve Swidler & J. David Diltz, Implied Volatilities and Transaction Costs, 
27 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 437, 446 (1992).  However, non-constant volatility can be 
accommodated within binomial pricing models. 
107 See Charles W. Calomiris, Expensing Employee Stock Options 38 (AEI 
Working Paper, Aug. 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.22873/pub_detail.asp (suggesting that valuation 
errors may exceed 20% in 10% of the cases); Carol A. Marquardt, The Cost of 
Employee Stock Option Grants: An Empirical Assessment, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 1191, 1214 
(2002) (finding that while an adjusted Black-Scholes model provided reasonable 
estimates of ex post option cost, on average, there was “significant variability in the 
amount of model error on an option-by-option basis”). 
108 See Peter Fortune, Anomalies in Option Pricing: The Black-Scholes Model 
Revisited, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Mar./Apr. 1996, at 17, 23. 
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significant liquidity discounts, which are not incorporated in the option 
pricing models.109   
 
 Furthermore, GAAP valuation of employee options does not adjust 
directly for the effect of non-transferability.  Rather, SFAS 123R 
instructs firms to adjust indirectly by incorporating assumptions 
regarding early exercise into their models.110  For users of Black-
Scholes, this generally means plugging a point estimate of the expected 
term to exercise into the model, which can lead to overvaluation.111  This 
problem can be addressed, although not without added complexity, by 
modifying the Black-Scholes approach or by using a binomial model 
which provides the flexibility to incorporate a probability distribution for 
option exercise.112     
 
 The FASB has recognized the imperfections in option pricing 
models, but has concluded that valuation estimates derived from these 
models are sufficiently reliable for recognition of option expense in 
financial statements.113  The FASB points out, quite rightly, that “few 
accrual-based accounting measurements can claim absolute 
reliability.”114  However, it is one thing to conclude that models are 
sufficiently reliable to determine aggregate option cost and aggregate 
reductions to accounting earnings; it is another to conclude they are 
reliable enough to form the basis of taxing individual optionees.  Given 
evidence of significant variability in pricing errors for particular option 
grants, we remain skeptical.115 
                                                 
109 See Calomiris, supra note 107. 
110 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ A15. 
111 At-the-money options generally exhibit a concave value profile over time such 
that the value of an option exercised in six years would be greater than the average 
value of options exercised in two years and in ten years.  As a result, using a single 
point estimate of term, instead of a distribution of potential exercise dates from vesting 
to expiration, generally results in over-estimation of option value.  See Thomas 
Hemmer et al., Estimating the “Fair Value” of Employee Stock Options with Expected 
Early Exercise, 8 ACCT. HORIZONS 23, 27-38 (1994); Phelim Boyle & William R. 
Scott, Executive Stock Options and Concavity of the Option Price, 13 J. DERIVATIVES 
72, 72-77 (2006).   
112 Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin (HMS) have proposed an adjustment to 
Black-Scholes to better account for early exercise.  See Hemmer et al., supra note 111, 
at 38-40.  Other commentators advocate use of the binomial model to account for 
option price concavity.  See Boyle & Scott, supra note 111, at 73-74, 76 (noting that 
the HMS adjustment becomes less accurate as more dispersed exercise distribution 
functions are assumed and suggesting that the binomial method is more suitable); Brian 
Maris et al., The Effect of Exercise Date Uncertainty on Employee Stock Option Value, 
30 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 669, 693 (demonstrating value overstatement using Black-
Scholes and advocating use of the binomial model). 
113 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6,  ¶ B60. 
114 Id. 
115 We should note that option pricing models are used for transfer tax purposes 
and in determining whether and to what extent an employee has received an excess 
parachute payment under IRC §§ 280G and 4999.  See Rev. Proc.  98-34 (valuation of 
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 The valuation issues with restricted stock are much simpler.  The fair 
value of restricted stock on the date of grant is simply the market value 
of unrestricted stock.116  In this case, GAAP valuation clearly does not 
reflect the diminution in value resulting from non-transferability prior to 
vesting.     
 
 Note that we have not discussed the difference between the 
opportunity cost to a firm of issuing stock or options and the typically 
lower value to recipients, who generally are poorly diversified and 
already face considerable firm-specific risk.117  GAAP does not consider 
subjective employee valuation for earnings purposes, and there is no 
reason to do so for tax purposes either.118  Of course, valuation discounts 
arising from a risk of forfeiture would apply to both hypothetical third 
party purchasers and employee recipients.  Thus, even if GAAP stock 
and option valuation was deemed sufficiently accurate to form the basis 
of employee taxation, the risk of forfeiture would have to be accounted 
for under a scheme taxing equity at grant.   
 
  b.  Liquidity 
 
 Restrictions on the transfer, exercise and sale of equity compensation 
instruments raise obvious liquidity concerns for employees taxed in 
                                                                                                                            
compensatory stock options for transfer tax purposes); Rev. Proc. 2003-68 (valuation 
of options for the purposes of §§ 280G and 4999).  However, in these cases, an 
immediate, snapshot valuation is required.  We do not have the option of waiting until 
option exercise to value the instrument. 
As discussed below, we also believe that limitations on the accuracy of the pricing 
models applied to long-term options, in combination with a number of other factors, 
suggest revising GAAP accounting for options to conform with that of SARs.  See 
infra Part III.C.  However, we remain less concerned about inaccurate financial 
statements than inaccurate employee tax valuations.  
116 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ 21. 
117 See, e.g., Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 21, 26 (2003) (noting that inadequate diversification and vesting 
and other restrictions on disposition create a wedge between the opportunity cost of 
equity compensation to the issuing firm and the subjective valuation of the typical 
recipient). 
118 If employees value stock and options below their “cost,” they will demand 
more of them, or more of some other type of compensation.  This value gap is absorbed 
by firms as the cost of providing performance and retention incentives.  However, to be 
administrable, the tax system must value compensation in the form of property at the 
fair market value of that property. 
Moreover, with respect to options, proper valuation takes into account premature 
exercise motivated by employee risk aversion, which reduces the gap between firm 
cost and employee value.  This gap is not completely eliminated, however, because 
employees are not free to exercise options at any time.  They are prohibited from 
exercising options prior to vesting.  See Rubinstein, supra note 53, at 15 (arguing that a 
differential between employer and employee value of options can only arise during the 
period prior to vesting). 
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complete conformity with GAAP.  In the example above, if § 83 is 
inapplicable, the employee receiving an option with grant date value of 
$1 million would recognize up to $1 million of ordinary income before 
she became entitled to exercise the option.119  The severity of the 
liquidity problem would vary considerably.  We might have little 
sympathy for the large public company CEO who has considerable 
accumulated wealth with which to pay the tax and who can probably 
negotiate sufficient cash salary to pay the tax in any event.  However, we 
should be concerned about the stereotypical rank and file employee of 
the cash-strapped Silicon Valley startup who has little accumulated 
wealth and for whom equity represents a large fraction of compensation.  
However, liquidity concerns could be alleviated by permitting recipients 
to defer payment of the tax assessed on the grant date value of stock or 
options until vesting or exercise.  Accruing interest over the deferral 
period would add a further complication, but the liquidity problem alone 
is not insurmountable, at least for options that are eventually 
exercised.120   
 
  c.  Option Expiration Out of the Money 
 
 But what about the unlucky employee whose option expires out of 
the money?  Consider two employees – Lucky and Unlucky.  Each 
receives an option with grant date value of $100,000.  Five years later, 
Lucky’s pays off to the tune of $500,000.  If taxed in conformity with 
GAAP, Lucky would have $100,000 of ordinary income recognized over 
the vesting period plus a $400,000 long term capital gain.121  Unlucky’s 
option expires unexercised.  Options that vest but expire unexercised are 
still expensed under SFAS 123R and would generate a tax deduction for 
the employer under conformity proposals.  Accordingly, Unlucky would 
also have $100,000 of ordinary income and a $100,000 capital loss.  
Given current capital loss limitations, this result might seem harsh.122   
 
 Of course, Unlucky’s tax result is identical to that of an employee 
who receives $100,000 cash compensation and purchases an option for 
$100,000 that expires out of the money.  If equity compensation 
                                                 
119 Typically, the last portion of income would be recognized in the year the option 
vests. 
120 The value of conformity as a check on manipulation lies in having the same 
valuation serve multiple purposes.  Nothing turns on the timing of payments.  
Payments can be deferred, possibly at the taxpayer’s option, with interest assessed at 
the market rate. 
121 Lucky would have $100,000 basis in the instrument when that amount was 
taken into income.  Recall that our assumption in this section is that § 83 is repealed for 
equity compensation permitting assessment of tax (and perhaps collection) for 
unvested compensation.  
122 Under current law, capital losses of individuals may be deducted against capital 
gains and up to $3000 of ordinary income.  See IRC § 1211(b). 
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arrangements are just as voluntary, no relief is required.  But if Congress 
felt that relief was warranted because of imperfect information or 
bargaining, it could allow the recipient an ordinary loss or waive the 
capital loss limitation.  But doing so might provide too much or too little 
relief.  First, from the perspective of Unlucky ex post, unless income 
recognition was deferred until exercise (or expiration) without the 
collection of interest, Unlucky would still bear a considerable tax cost 
related to the ultimately worthless option.123  Moreover, given variations 
in tax rates and/or Unlucky’s income, the value of the subsequent 
deduction could be greater or less than the tax cost of the initial 
inclusion. 
 
 Others might have little sympathy for Unlucky’s tax complaints if 
Congress treats these losses as ordinary.  After all, this approach is 
perfectly consistent with the tax law’s treatment of interest forfeited as a 
result of early withdrawal from a CD and similar forfeitures.124  These 
critics might argue that allowing ordinary deductions is too generous ex 
ante.  The combination of capital gain treatment for appreciated equity 
compensation and ordinary loss treatment of depreciated awards would 
cause equity compensation to be significantly tax advantaged versus 
                                                 
123 Employee stock options typically expire ten years after grant.  For options that 
begin vesting after one year and expire unexercised, the employee would bear the tax 
cost for up to nine years unless income inclusion was deferred until exercise/expiration 
and interest on the deferred tax was ignored. 
Although we have focused on the worst case scenario of options expiring out of 
the money, the issue addressed in this paragraph would arise anytime the realized value 
of a stock or option grant was less than its grant date value. 
Note further that we have experience with a similar problem already.  By offering 
the prospect of further deferred taxation at lower capital gains rates, current tax law 
encourages ISO recipients to hold the stock received on exercise for a year. See IRC 
§ 422(a). However, for AMT purposes, the spread on the ISO at exercise is included in 
income. See IRC § 56(b)(3). As a result, many individuals have been caught up in an 
ISO trap, exercising options resulting in large paper gains and AMT and finding that 
the value of their stock has declined precipitously prior to the date on which they could 
sell and enjoy the capital gains rate preference.  See Warren Rojas, Outdated AMT 
Claims First Victims of the 21st Century, 91 TAX NOTES 691 (2001); Robert L. 
Sommers, ISOs Meet the AMT:  Employees Ambushed by the Tax Code, 91 TAX NOTES 
2055 (2001). 
While this result may seem unfair (and a number of bills have been introduced in 
Congress to provide relief (see a list at www.reformamt.org)), generally the ISO 
recipients could have sold their shares on exercise and paid tax at ordinary rates.  In the 
complete tax to book conformity world that is envisioned here, employee taxation 
would be based on a value that could not be realized due to restrictions on transfer and 
exercise. (Of course, the terms of NQSOs are subject to negotiation between the 
parties.  Vesting and transfer restrictions are not inherent in option compensation.) 
Moreover, since NQSO use dominates that of ISOs, this problem would reach a much 
larger population. 
124 § 1341, which addresses the tax consequences of an amount restored that had 
been held under a claim of right, is an obvious exception to this rule.  But while that 
provision accounts for changes in marginal rates, it does not compensate taxpayers for 
time value of money. 
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cash compensation.125  To be sure, current taxation of equity may be tax 
advantaged versus cash compensation in some cases.126  But grant date 
taxation combined with ordinary loss treatment would be even more 
clearly tax advantaged, and could lead employers to inefficiently favor 
option compensation over other arrangements. 
 
  d.  Forfeiture 
 
 Stock and option grants typically are forfeited if the employee’s 
service is terminated prior to a predetermined vesting date.127  Under 
SFAS 123R, companies reduce their aggregate accounting expense for 
stock and option compensation to reflect expected and actual forfeiture 
rates.  Basing employer tax deductions for equity compensation on the 
same aggregate figures is not problematic, but adjusting for forfeiture at 
the employee level adds a further complication to full conformity.   
 
 There are at least two possibilities.  First, forfeiture could be treated 
in the same manner as the expiration of an unexercised option, i.e., 
producing a capital loss.  Taxing equity recipients on an accrual basis 
without explicit relief for awards that fail to vest might strike some as 
particularly unfair because of the resemblance to an endowment tax.128  
An unvested grant of equity compensation represents a heightened 
ability to earn income in the future as the employee performs services 
that turn her human capital into cash.  Taxing prior to vesting – that is, 
taxing the employee currently based on the performance of future 
services – comes close to treating mere ability, rather than the actual 
performance of services, as the basis of taxation, particularly if the 
taxpayer is not made whole for taxes paid on awards that are forfeited.  
Taxing such unrealized returns from human capital could be viewed as 
infringing on the taxpayer’s autonomy by forcing her to continue 
employment in a high-paying job just to pay the tax on services she has 
                                                 
125 The comparison is to a case in which the employee is paid in cash and invests 
the after-tax amount in employer equity.  In that case, all gains or losses would be 
capital. 
126 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
127 Traditionally, vesting of equity compensation was based solely on continued 
service.  In the late 1990s, responding to criticism that service-vested awards were 
insufficiently linked to performance, many firms began issuing equity compensation 
that vested based both on service and on objective performance criteria.  See Carr 
Bettis et al., Equity Grants with Performance-Based Vesting Conditions 7 (Working 
Paper, Mar. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=972424 (finding in an 
examination of proxy statements of 2,055 firms from 1995 to 2001, 475 utilized 
performance-based vesting or payout conditions).  
128 For a summary of the objections to endowment taxation, see Lawrence Zelenak, 
Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145, 1156-62 (2006) (describing “talent slavery” 
and other objections).   
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not yet performed.129  To be sure, because entering into the employment 
contract is a voluntary act, taxing the employee on the date of grant is 
not as objectionable as the usual “enslaving the beachcomber” objection 
to endowment taxation.  Still, taxing employees today for services they 
will perform in the future cuts against the grain of our realization-based 
income tax system. 
 
 Alternatively, we might choose not to include in income the value of 
stock or option grants that fail to vest as a result of service termination.  
This could be accomplished by assessing employee tax based on grant 
date values, deferring collection at least until stock or options vest, and 
eliminating the tax obligation with respect to instruments that fail to vest 
as a result of service termination.  Another approach would be to reverse 
the ordinary income that was recognized prior to forfeiture in the event 
of service termination prior to vesting, perhaps with relief for time value 
and adverse changes in marginal tax rates.130 
 
 If the failure of stock or options to vest is unrelated to the value of 
the equity, canceling out the income seems reasonable.  For accounting, 
employer tax, and employee tax purposes, it would be as if the equity 
compensation had not been granted.  But, unless all equity compensation 
losses were treated as ordinary, such a system would raise the specter of 
opportunistic relinquishment of underwater equity instruments to avoid 
capital loss treatment.131   
  
  e.  Manipulation Potential 
 
 Accuracy issues aside, ex ante stock option valuation, which requires 
firm-specific assumptions regarding stock price volatility, expected time 
                                                 
129 To be sure, employment is voluntary and compensation arrangements are 
negotiable at some level.  Thus, the “wage-slave” analogy is not as persuasive in this 
case as it might be with respect to proposals, for example, to tax law professors on the 
salaries they could earn in private practice. 
130 Providing relief for adverse changes in marginal tax rates would be consistent 
with the treatment in IRC § 1341 of amounts restored that had been held under a claim 
of right.  See supra note 124.  An approach that provided relief for time value of money 
in addition to adverse changes in marginal rates could be thought of as “§ 1341 plus.” 
131 It would not be a good idea, for example, to treat all forfeitures as a result of 
employment termination as ordinary losses and all other relinquishments/out-of-the-
money expirations as capital losses, as this approach might distort employment 
decisions at the margin.  Suppose tax was to be collected at vesting based on the $1 
million grant date value of an option granted to a CEO.  Suppose that several months 
prior to vesting the option is far out of the money and worth only $100,000.  Assume 
that if the option vests the CEO incurs tax of $350,000 (at 35%) on property worth far 
less.  If the CEO departs, no tax will be assessed with respect to the option.  Of course, 
the employer’s tax position would be reversed.  If employment is terminated prior to 
vesting, the expense and tax deduction are reversed.  However, the value of the tax 
deduction will not necessarily offset the cost of the employee’s tax obligation, and thus 
a negotiated solution is not inevitable.  In some cases, employment could be affected. 
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to exercise, and dividend policy, is highly manipulable.132  Option 
valuation at exercise is not.  Simply put, why would we want to increase 
the importance of the more manipulable valuation method by using it to 
assess employee tax as well as employer option expense and employer 
tax deductions?133   
 
 In a regime in which both employee and employer tax were based on 
ex ante option valuation, executives would generally have two 
incentives to minimize those values – increasing reported earnings and 
minimizing the personal taxes of themselves and their employees.  To be 
sure, employer deductibility provides a counter incentive.  However, it 
would not be surprising to discover that executives often would find the 
final consideration – deductibility for the firm – to be the least important 
of the three.   
 
 The recent option backdating scandal provides a cautionary tale.  
Evidence of backdated option grants suggests a widespread willingness 
to bend the rules when the compensation of executives and subordinates 
is at stake.  Evidence of backdated option exercise indicates a 
willingness to sacrifice corporate tax deductions for personal tax 
savings.134  Moreover, like backdating, manipulation of ex ante option 
valuation would be difficult to detect. 
                                                 
132 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
133 Professors Ethan Yale and Gregg Polsky have similarly concluded that “the 
malleability of the accounting valuation rules [for NQSOs] make them a poor guide for 
assessing taxes.”  See Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of 
Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571, 590-91 (2007).  As noted above, 
restricted stock valuation is much less manipulable than option valuation.  Thus, this 
concern applies almost exclusively to options. 
134 See Eric Dash, Dodging Taxes Is a New Wrinkle in the Stock Options Game, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at C1 (reporting allegations of exercise backdating at 
Symbol Technologies and Mercury Interactive); Jennifer Levitz, Comverse Ex-CEO 
May Have Fudged Option Exercise Dates, Not Just Grants, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2006, 
at C1 (reporting suspicious exercise timing at Comverse).  Backdating option exercise 
to a low stock price date effectively converts a portion of what would be ordinary 
income for the employee into capital gain.  This conversion would reduce the 
employee’s income tax bill as well as the employment taxes paid by both parties.  
However, the firm loses an income tax deduction for the portion converted.  See 
Walker, supra note 47, at 618 n.219.  Unless the issuing firm faced a very low 
marginal tax rate, this tradeoff is unlikely to be net tax efficient.  The tradeoff, in fact, 
is similar to the choice between granting ISOs and NQSOs.  See supra note 51 and 
accompanying text.   
Of course, there are many other examples of firms inefficiently sacrificing 
corporate tax deductions.  For instance, firms routinely forfeit tax deductions for 
executive pay by failing to utilize compensation structures that satisfy § 162(m), e.g., 
by paying executives salaries in excess of $1 million per year.  See supra note 51 for 
further discussion of that and similar examples.  It is also well established that firms 
sacrifice corporate tax benefits to improve financial accounting results.  See Douglas A. 
Shackelford & Terry Shevlin, Empirical Tax Research in Accounting, 31 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 321, 327 (2001). 
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 Of course, the incentives of executives to manipulate option values 
will vary depending on their sensitivity to earnings, corporate tax, and 
personal tax issues.  We will have more to say about this in subpart 2 
below.  Our point here is simply that scope for manipulation, whatever 
the desired direction, is greater with respect to ex ante than ex post 
valuation.  
 
  f.  Avoidance and/or Distortions 
 
 Yet another problem with book/tax conformity based on grant date 
values for stock and options is that the regime is, in effect, voluntary and 
elective.  Without extensive adjustments elsewhere, companies could 
choose between grant date book/tax conformity and other regimes that 
generate economically similar results with better regulatory treatment, 
depending on their strategic preferences.   
 
 First, consider SARs, which are cash awards that mimic stock option 
contracts and are economically equivalent to options.  Under GAAP, 
SARs are considered liabilities rather than equity and are accounted for 
on a mark to market basis.135  Under comprehensive book/tax 
conformity, SAR taxation (let us assume both employer and employee 
taxation) would be marked to market as well.  SAR recipients would still 
face liquidity issues, but assuming that gains and losses were treated as 
ordinary, firms and employees could avoid many of the harshest aspects 
of grant date tax valuation of options by switching to SARs. 
 
 Of course, SAR accounting could be revised to be consistent with 
option accounting.  But if it was, that would just shift the inevitable line-
drawing problem between incentive arrangements treated as equity 
compensation and arrangements treated as cash compensation.  For 
example, how would we treat cash bonus plans tied to reported earnings 
rather than increases in stock prices?  Would participants be taxed based 
on an ex ante estimated value as well?  Surely at some point, firms 
would be able to structure incentive programs that result in ex post 
taxation of employees, even if such programs were not ideal from the 
point of view of aligning the employee’s incentives with shareholders.  
Managers might be willing to swallow a small increase in agency costs 
in order to avoid grant-date taxation.136 
 
                                                 
135 See infra Part III.C.1 for a detailed example of mark to market accounting 
applied to SARs. 
136 In their recent analysis of the taxation of deferred compensation, Professors 
Yale and Polsky question whether reform of deferred compensation taxation is 
worthwhile if all inconsistencies in the taxation of cash, deferred, and equity 
compensation cannot be eliminated.  See Yale & Polsky, supra note 133, at 589-92.  
Our inquiry here is similar. 
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 Let us suppose, however, that a program of grant date taxation of 
stock, options, and their close substitutes could somehow be made to be 
“sticky.”  If the participants remain dissatisfied, they will simply 
substitute old fashioned cash bonuses.  This shift might or might not be 
efficient.  (Although the shift looks like a tax-induced distortion in pay 
practices, we cannot be sure that the status quo baseline is non-
distortionary.)  However, depending on how relief for liquidity, loss 
limitations, and forfeiture were handled, the new regime very well could 
induce an inefficient distortion in corporate pay.   
 
 The electivity of grant date book/tax conformity is highlighted by the 
critical design question of whether to apply the regime to privately-held 
companies.  Professor Shaviro’s proposal, for example, would apply 
only to public companies.137  As a result, companies that believed that 
book-tax conformity would reduce tax deductions and increase their cost 
of compensation might choose to go private, or remain private, in greater 
numbers.  Book/tax conformity would thus exacerbate the penalty of 
increased tax and auditing costs associated with going public.    
 
 Of course, given the manipulability of ex ante option valuation, it’s 
possible that some firms might be more attracted to options in a world of 
complete ex ante conformity.  The opportunity to game valuation for one 
purpose or another would provide a planning option for firms utilizing 
option compensation and represent a distortion in the other direction.138  
 
 Senator Levin’s proposal, without explanation, apparently applies to 
all companies, public or private, which obviously raises other 
gamesmanship concerns.139  Because many privately-held companies 
need not comply with GAAP, they would have considerable flexibility 
in valuing options so as to maximize the tax deduction (and reduce the 
less important reported earnings).  By retaining current rules for 
employee taxation, the Levin proposal invites massive gamesmanship by 
privately-held firms.  We expand on this issue below. 
 
2.  De-Linking Employer and Employee Taxation 
 
                                                 
137 See Shaviro, supra note 2, at 60-61. 
138 Under current rules, stock options provide firms with an opportunity to 
minimize compensation expense and executive compensation disclosure.  If employer 
and employee tax were conformed with book, firms would also have the opportunity to 
minimize employee tax or potentially maximize employer tax deductions.  As 
suggested above, one would expect discretion to be used to minimize the reported 
value of options under this regime, but situations might arise in which corporate tax 
concerns dominate other considerations. 
139 See S. 2116, 110th Cong. § (q)(1) (2007) (limiting deduction to the amount taxpayer 
has treated as an expense “in a report or statement to shareholders, partners, or other 
proprietors (or to beneficiaries),” without limitation to publicly-traded entities).  
 39
 If conforming employee taxation of equity compensation to book is 
unattractive, then proposals (like the Levin proposal) conforming 
employer taxation to book must give up the matching principle which 
limits and links an employer’s tax deductions to the amounts included by 
the employee.  De-linking employer and employee taxation of equity 
compensation raises a particularly thorny set of issues.  
 
 Severing the link between employer and employee taxation of equity 
compensation is not inherently objectionable.  As Professor Halperin has 
explained, matching the timing of employer and employee taxation is 
not necessary to achieve correct and consistent taxation.140  Consider 
deferred compensation that is earned in an initial year and paid out in a 
subsequent year.  Halperin demonstrates that deduction and inclusion in 
the initial year, deduction and inclusion in the subsequent year, and 
deduction in the initial year and inclusion in the subsequent year all 
produce the same tax result so long as the investment return on the 
deferred compensation is taxed at the same rate.  This equivalence holds 
for equity compensation as well, even though the returns are much less 
certain.141   
 
 Importantly, however, giving up the matching principle would create 
new gaming opportunities for companies compensating employees with 
options.  There are at least two possibilities.  First, we could simply 
retain the current tax rules for optionees, while conforming employer 
taxation to book.  Under this approach, employee taxation of options 
would continue to be based on realized gains.  An employer’s tax 
deduction for options, however, would be based on expected values 
derived from an option pricing model.  Thus, firms could adopt 
assumptions regarding expected time to exercise, stock price volatility, 
and anticipated dividend yields that inflate calculated grant date values 
and corporate tax deductions without impacting the amount of income 
included by their employees.142  
 
 To be sure, inflating grant date valuation to boost corporate tax 
deductions would also result in increased compensation expense for 
financial reporting purposes and increased executive compensation 
reported in proxy statements.  For some firms, these counterweights 
would limit or preclude inflation of the tax deduction.  But privately-
held firms, of course, could easily be tempted to trade increased cash 
                                                 
140 See Halperin, supra note 29, at 520. 
141 See Walker, supra note 29. 
142 See Rubinstein, supra note 53 (estimating that a firm wishing to over-state 
option values could reasonably select assumptions yielding expected values almost 
twice those of a firm wishing to undervalue options).  To be sure, employer and 
employee taxation of qualified plans is also de-linked, but in this case the employer 
contribution is in cash which presents no valuation or manipulation issue.  Option 
valuation is uniquely manipulable.   
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flow for a decrease in reported earnings presented to their private 
investors with a wink and a nod.   
 
 Even if conformity is limited to public firms, the gamesmanship 
issue remains.  Reported earnings may be of limited usefulness in 
constraining gamesmanship among quasi-public companies (such as 
those that trade on closed exchanges for institutional investors) or those 
companies that voluntarily follow GAAP (or International Accounting 
Standards) and therefore might fall within the scope of book/tax 
conformity.   
 
 Moreover, not every traditional public company is a slave to reported 
earnings.  After-tax cash flows also matter to managers, and it is not 
self-evident that reported earnings and compensation disclosure are 
better restraints on gamesmanship than employee-level taxes.  In any 
event, firms with a strong focus on cash flow and limited sensitivity to 
reported earnings and compensation disclosure would be tempted to 
exploit the tax gap and select option valuation assumptions that produce 
outsized tax deductions.143 
 
 A second possibility would be to conform employee taxation of 
options to book (and employer tax) to the extent possible without 
violating the principle of § 83.  This would mean taxing options at 
vesting.  If implemented consistently with the taxation of restricted 
stock, options would be revalued at vesting using one of the option 
pricing models, since the option spread at vesting would not fully reflect 
the option’s value at that point.144  Although this approach would 
overcome the employee liquidity and forfeiture concerns, its weaknesses 
should be readily apparent.  Option valuation for employer and 
employee tax purposes would remain de-linked, allowing firms to select 
grant date model inputs that increase option costs and employer tax 
deductions.  In addition, unlike the current employee taxation of options, 
revaluation at vesting would allow firms to select vesting date 
assumptions that decrease option values and employee tax inclusions.  
                                                 
143 We can only speculate as to how severe this problem might be, as there is no 
precedent of de-linking employee and employer taxation of options.  But consider, for 
example, a public company that is already planning to take a major hit to reported 
earnings from a one-time event, such as a restructuring.  The company may wish to 
issue stock options to employees that year using a high volatility estimate and thus a 
high valuation of the options, increasing the firm’s tax deduction.  This one-time hit to 
corporate reported earnings is offset by the benefit of increased cash flow from lower 
taxes.  Because the employees would not pay tax until realization, they would have no 
reason to object to the high estimated initial value of the options.   
144 See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 10. 
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Meanwhile, this approach remains susceptible to criticisms regarding the 
(in)applicability of option pricing models to employee options.145   
  
 In sum, severing the link between employer and employee taxation 
of equity compensation raises severe policy concerns.  For companies 
that are indifferent to reported earnings, the gamesmanship opportunities 
would be plentiful.   
 
 
C.  Conforming GAAP to Tax 
 
 
 Book/tax conformity proponents generally take GAAP as a given 
and assume that conformity would require modification of tax rules to 
mirror GAAP.  That is probably a reasonable assumption for 
comprehensive book/tax conformity proposals.  However, in the 
particular case of equity compensation, it is conceivable that GAAP 
could be conformed to mirror the tax rules.  The model exists in the 
GAAP rules applicable to cash-settled SARs.  Applying these rules to 
stock options, and possibly to restricted stock, could produce conformity 
of tax, accounting, and compensation disclosure, all at the realized value 
end of the spectrum. 
 
GAAP Conformed to Tax:  
Measurement of NQSOs  
(and Perhaps Restricted Stock) 
 
Financial Accounting Realized Value 
Employer Tax Realized Value 
Employee Tax Realized Value 
 
 
1.  Example of the SAR Expensing Method Applied to Options 
 
Under SFAS 123R, the expense associated with SARs is initially 
calculated using an option pricing model and grant date information on 
the stock price, volatility, etc.  However, the ultimate measurement date 
                                                 
145 Several improvements could be made to this bare bones approach.  For 
example, the spread of an option at vesting could serve as a lower bound on the 
permitted valuation for employee taxation.  The value of an option with remaining life 
always exceeds the current spread, but for options well in the money, the difference 
between option value and spread may be slight.  See id.  Another possibility would be 
to dispense with revaluation at vesting and tax employee recipients based on the grant 
date valuation.  That approach, however, is the same as full conformity with relief from 
tax until vesting. 
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for SAR expense is the exercise date.  In the interim, SAR expense is 
recalculated at the end of each reporting period.146   
 
Let’s compare expense reporting for options and SARs to highlight 
the difference.  First, assume a firm issues an NQSO to an executive on 
January 1, 2008 with grant date Black-Scholes value of $3 million, and 
assume that the option vests over three years.  If the option does indeed 
vest, the expense recognized for that option would be $1 million per year 
for each of the three years between grant and vesting.   
 
However, if the instrument granted is an economically equivalent 
SAR instead of an NQSO, the value would be recalculated periodically 
and the book expense adjusted accordingly.  Suppose that at the end of 
2008, the Black-Scholes value of the SAR based on the then current 
stock price, volatility, and remaining life is $4.5 million.  The expense 
recognized for 2008 would be $1.5 million (1/3 of $4.5 million) instead 
of $1 million.  Suppose that at the end of 2009, the recalculated value is 
$6 million.  Because service has been provided for two years, the 
cumulative expense that must be recognized is $4 million.  Thus, the 
expense recognized for 2009 would be $2.5 million ($4 million less the 
$1.5 million expense recognized in 2008).  Suppose at the end of 2010 
when the SAR vests, the recalculated value is $5 million.  The expense 
recognized for 2010 would be $1 million in order to produce a 
cumulative expense of $5 million.147   
 
However, marking SAR expense to market does not end with 
vesting.  It continues until the instrument is exercised.148  Suppose at the 
end of 2011 the SAR remains unexercised and has a calculated value of 
$6.5 million.  The issuer would recognize compensation expense of $1.5 
million for 2011.  Finally, suppose the SAR is exercised in 2012 and 
results in a payment to the recipient of $7 million.  $500,000 of 
compensation expense would be recognized in 2011, bringing the 
cumulative recognized compensation expense in line with the realized 
value of the instrument. 
  
 Marking stock options to market in the same fashion would produce 
eventual conformity between book and tax.  Assuming that the SEC 
continued to base its executive compensation disclosure rules on 
expense recognition under GAAP, all four measures of compensation 
would eventually conform.  Recall that under current proxy disclosure 
rules, the summary executive compensation disclosure table includes as 
option compensation each year the amount expensed per GAAP.149  
                                                 
146 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ 36. 
147 See id. ¶ A127-A133 for a similar example. 
148 See id. ¶ 36. 
149 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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Thus, for our executive, the disclosed option compensation would be as 
follows: 2008, $1.5 million; 2009, $2.5 million; 2010, $1 million; 2011, 
$1.5 million; 2012, $0.5 million.  Of course, the value of option 
compensation reported in the table detailing grants of equity awards 
would continue to be $3 million.  SAR and option treatment are identical 
in that regard, as they must be.  
 
2.  Pros and Cons of Conforming Book to Tax 
 
 The prospect of a final day of reconciliation between the tax and 
financial accounting books should dampen enthusiasm for under-
reporting option expense at grant, but it is possible that this method of 
conforming the books would do less to dissuade firms from gaming 
earnings than the alternative of conforming tax to GAAP.  Under an 
expected value approach, firms that care about tax face a stark tradeoff 
at grant between minimizing taxes and maximizing reported earnings.  
Under a realized value approach, the tradeoff is postponed, and one can 
imagine firms shading initial and interim option expense down, all the 
while realizing that the expense recognized and compensation revealed 
in the year of exercise will be commensurately larger.150  
 
 On the other hand, the two approaches to conformity both achieve a 
primary goal of reformers, which is to ensure that corporate tax 
deductions do not exceed the amount reported to investors.151  
Moreover, conforming book to tax would leave the current tax rules in 
place, and doing so has several advantages over conformity at book.  
First, as we have discussed above, the linkage between employer and 
employee tax valuation, particularly when both are based on realized 
value, helps combat valuation gaming with respect to tax.  Second, this 
approach eliminates any possible private company/public company 
distinction and distortion relating to the tax rules for equity 
compensation.  Third, this approach provides the added bonus of 
eliminating the inconsistency between the accounting treatment of 
economically equivalent options and SARs. 
  
 What are the downsides to conforming book to tax?  Some firms 
might object to basing ultimate stock option expense on realized values 
rather than expected values from a salience perspective.  The concern 
would be that investors will ignore all the options that expire out of the 
money, but will be outraged by the few options that are exercised for 
                                                 
150 For example, suppose the firm in our hypothetical manipulates the inputs into 
the Black-Scholes model to produce an initial option value of $2.5 million instead of 
$3 million.  The firm might continue to use assumptions that reduce accruals between 
2008 and 2011.  However, when the instrument is exercised in 2012, the firm would be 
forced to recognize the difference between the $7 million realized value and the 
cumulative amount recognized as an expense up to that point. 
151 See Levin statement, supra note 3. 
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huge gains, thus unreasonably penalizing the most successful firms and 
executives.152  It is not clear, however, that this would be a serious 
drawback to conforming book to tax.  Under current GAAP rules, total 
gains on executive option exercises are clearly disclosed in a separate 
table.153  Presumably, that table would remain unchanged if book were 
conformed to tax.  Of course, that table only discloses compensation for 
the top five executives.  Total compensation expense subtracted from 
reported earnings would include all annual gains or losses on options.  
But, again, under a mark to market approach, the total realized values of 
options would not be subtracted from earnings as a lump sum.  The 
amount would be subtracted on an accrual basis.  One would think that 
from a salience perspective, marking to market would tend to reduce the 
kind of huge, lumpy compensation expense that is most likely to 
produce outrage.   
 
 A second potential problem lies in implementation.  The FASB has 
only recently addressed this issue, and it concluded that grant date 
measurement of option compensation is preferable to measurement at 
exercise, the approach utilized with SARs.154  Convincing the FASB to 
reverse its position on this point would be difficult.   
 
 However, reversal is conceivable for several reasons.  First, it is 
clear from the statements of the FASB over the last fifteen years that the 
group’s primary concern in this area is that option compensation be 
expensed.155  With respect to details – grant or settlement date 
measurement – the strength of conviction is less obvious.  The academic 
community appears to be split on the option measurement question,156 
                                                 
152 See Polsky, supra note 42, at 909 (arguing that “public uproar over options 
inevitably occurs upon exercise rather than upon grant”). 
153 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
154 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ B43-B48.  This view is shared by the 
International Accounting Standards Board.  See id. ¶ B48 (noting consistency with 
international accounting standards); INT’L ACCT. STD. BD., TECHNICAL SUMMARY, 
IFRS 2: SHARE-BASED PAYMENT 1 (2008) (noting that the “fair value of equity 
instruments granted [to employees] is measured at grant date”). 
155 See generally FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., EXPOSURE DRAFT: ACCOUNTING FOR 
STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION (1993); SFAS 123, supra note 13; SFAS 123R, supra 
note 6. 
156 Although the FASB ultimately adopted grant date measurement in SFAS 123R, 
numerous commentators advocated exercise date measurement based on the liability-
like character of equity compensation, the lack of a practical difference between 
options and cash-settled SARS, and the mitigating effect of exercise date valuation on 
the problems inherent in applying option pricing models to employee options.  See 
SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ B43-45.  See also, AM. ACCT. ASS’N FIN. ACCT. STD. 
COMM., RESPONSE TO IASB EXPOSURE DRAFT, “SHARE-BASED PAYMENT,” (2003) 
(arguing in favor of exercise date measurement of stock option expense); Steven 
Balsam, Extending the Method of Accounting for Stock Appreciation Rights to 
Employee Stock Options, 8 ACCT. HORIZONS 52 (1994) (same); Michael Kirschenheiter 
et al., Accounting for Employee Stock Options, 18 Acct. Horizons 135 (2004) (same); 
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and there are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches.  
Conceptually, one might favor grant date measurement under the view 
that the tradeoff is made at that point between cash and option 
compensation and that the cash equivalent should constitute the measure 
of the expense.157  On the other hand, as the FASB notes in SFAS 123R, 
settlement date measurement would mitigate concerns regarding the 
accuracy of option pricing models and is the usual accounting response 
to uncertainty.158  Further, although neutrality is an expressed objective 
within the FASB’s conceptual framework,159 SFAS 123R does not 
adequately address the discrepancy between the treatment of 
economically equivalent options and SARs.  Instead it relies on the 
conclusion that SARs represent liabilities, while options are equity 
instruments, a distinction of absolutely no moment to firms and their 
employees and seemingly the weakest possible basis for line drawing.  
To be sure, this inconsistency could be resolved in either direction and 
SARs are granted much less frequently than options, so, in isolation, this 
is not an overwhelming argument for revising the measurement date for 
option compensation.160   
 
 There is, however, an additional argument for switching to the SAR 
approach that is not expressly addressed in SFAS 123R, and that is the 
susceptibility of option pricing models to manipulation.  The FASB 
recognized that the mark-to-market approach utilized in accounting for 
SARs would mitigate concerns about the applicability of option pricing 
models developed for traded options to compensatory options, but they 
appeared to view this as simply an accuracy of measurement issue.161 
Manipulation is another question.  It is conceivable that if the FASB 
                                                                                                                            
Gerald J. Lobo & Joseph C. Rue, Accounting for Stock Options: Comparison of 
Alternative Approaches, 16 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 27, 36 (2000) (same); Ara Volkan, 
The FASB Should Revisit Stock Options, 2 J. AM. ACAD. BUS. 254 (same). 
157 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ B46.  By this view, SAR accounting conflates 
compensation expense (grant date value) with a firm’s bet on its own stock price (the 
mark to market requirement). 
158 See id. ¶ B45. 
159 See FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., FACTS ABOUT FASB 2 (2007), available at 
www.FASB.org (providing FASB mission statement which states as a precept that the 
FASB will “ensure, insofar as possible, the neutrality of information resulting from its 
standards” and notes FASB’s belief that the “public interest is best served by 
developing neutral standards that result in accounting for similar transactions and 
circumstances in a like manner”). 
160 It remains to be seen, however, whether rationalization of accounting for at-the-
money NQSOs per SFAS 123R will revitalize the use of SARs, or whether the 
remaining difference as described herein will result in a continued preference for 
options. 
161 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6155, ¶ B45 (“Concerns about how to apply 
option-pricing models initially developed for traded options to forfeitable, 
nontransferable employee options are much less significant if final measurement is 
based on the intrinsic value, if any, that an employee realizes by exercising an 
option.”). 
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were convinced that firms were using the discretion inherent in the 
option pricing models to minimize compensation expense, that factor 
might persuade them to reverse course.  As noted above, there is 
evidence of valuation manipulation of footnoted option expense prior to 
the promulgation of SFAS 123R.162  It is too early for researchers to 
have produced evidence of manipulation in the new era, but the 
incentive to manipulate is even greater today. 
 
 Although the FASB has disclaimed any intention of including non-
accounting considerations in its deliberations,163 this position should not 
deter the group from taking susceptibility of manipulation into account 
in weighing the pros and cons of various measurement alternatives.  
Ultimately, the potential for manipulation bears on the accuracy, 
repeatability, and value-relevance of financial statements, which the 
FASB has pledged to uphold.164 
 
 However, if the FASB cannot be convinced to adopt the SAR 
accounting approach for options, Congress or the SEC would have to 
intervene to conform book to tax.  While Congress revises the tax code 
at the drop of hat, it has rarely intervened in financial accounting 
matters, and we should be hesitant to encourage Congress to intervene.  
As one of us has argued elsewhere, congressional meddling in GAAP 
raises numerous concerns including the potential introduction of 
significantly greater lobbying effort into the standard setting process and 
capture of the process by the interest group with the most at stake, 
corporate management.165  It is entirely possible that if this question 
were brought before Congress the result could be reversal of SFAS 123R 
and a return to optional expensing of options rather than conforming 
option expense to tax. 
 
3.  A New Line Drawing Problem – Restricted Stock 
 
 However, even if the FASB could be convinced to adjust the 
measurement date for options, we must be careful that eliminating an 
inconsistency between options and SARs does not introduce another 
distortion in corporate compensation arrangements and, if options are 
                                                 
162 See supra Part III.A.2. 
163 See, e.g., FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., EXPOSURE DRAFT:  SHARE-BASED PAYMENT 
(Mar. 31, 2004), at C33 & 34 (noting that the FASB is required “to consider issues in 
an evenhanded manner, without attempting to encourage or discourage specific 
actions” and rejecting as irrelevant arguments that expensing stock options would have 
adverse economic consequences in causing firms to “reduce, eliminate, or otherwise 
revise” option programs”). 
164 See FACTS ABOUT FASB, supra note 159. 
165 See Walker, supra note 39, at y; see also Shaviro, supra note 2 (voicing 
concern with congressional involvement in the accounting standard setting process). 
(DW – page cite for your Financial Accounting article?) 
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accounted for like SARs, think about where the new line will be drawn 
between accounting based on expectation and realization.  Consider 
restricted stock.  Under current GAAP, the grant date value of restricted 
stock is recognized as an expense, which is allocated ratably across the 
vesting period.166  This approach is, of course, consistent with the 
current treatment of options.  For restricted stock, the grant date value is 
simply the fair market value of unrestricted stock – vesting and 
restrictions on transferability are ignored in determining value – 
although expense is not recognized for shares that fail to vest.167 
 
 It is certainly feasible, although perhaps less defensible, to switch to 
an “SAR approach” in expensing restricted stock.  The instruments 
could be marked to market in each period between grant and vesting, 
such that the cumulative expenses reported to investors in proxy and 
financial statements would equate to the market values of the stock on 
vesting.  But this would result in an accounting line being drawn 
between unrestricted and restricted stock, as unrestricted stock granted 
as compensation would certainly be expensed at its grant date value.  
Lack of transferability seems a thin basis for including investment 
returns in the compensation expense recognized with respect to 
restricted but not unrestricted stock. 
 
 The alternative is to draw the accounting line between restricted 
stock and options on the basis of the greater uncertainty in valuation and 
liability-like characteristics of the latter.168  The concern is that this 
approach could result in a distortion in firm preferences between these 
two very important compensation devices.  In theory, this approach 
should not be distorting.  Aside from risk, there is no bias between 
expected and realized value from the decision maker’s ex ante 
perspective.169  However, some firms might prefer the certainty of 
expected value based expense recognition; others might prefer that 
expense recognition track realized results.170  
 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
  
 
                                                 
166 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
167 See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ 21. 
168 See Kirschenheiter et al., supra note 156 (advocating treating options as 
liabilities for accounting purposes, but not share grants). 
169 See supra Part III.A.1. 
170  In one respect, drawing the line between stock options and restricted stock 
could reduce a distortion in accounting choice.  Option expense currently is 
manipulable; restricted stock expense is not.  That favors options over stock.  If 
conforming option expense with SARs and tax treatment reduces the incentive to game 
expense recognition, that distortion is reduced. 
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 There is no free lunch here.  As we have seen, increasing conformity 
along one axis to reduce the gaming of reported earnings may facilitate 
gaming of corporate tax deductions.  Conforming employee and 
employer tax treatment with GAAP raises concerns about liquidity, 
fairness, and manipulation.  Any move may affect tax- and accounting-
induced distortions in the selection of equity instruments.   
 
 Given all of these tradeoffs, it is not obvious which of the three 
equity compensation tax, disclosure, and accounting regimes discussed 
in this Article is superior – status quo, tax conformed to book, or book 
conformed to tax.  To us, however, it is a realistic possibility that current 
proposals to conform tax to book represent the third best of these three 
options and that the status quo may well be the best.   
 
 For proponents of comprehensive book/tax conformity, the question 
must be whether equity compensation should fall under the default rule, 
i.e., its tax treatment conformed to book, or whether it should stand as an 
exception.  It is not clear within the context of the overall book/tax gap 
that equity compensation is a serious problem.  To be sure, it has 
historically represented a large fraction of the gap in raw numbers, but 
SFAS 123R will largely eliminate the aggregate options gap.  Moreover, 
the book/tax difference attributable to stock options is readily 
identifiable firm by firm; it does not appear to contribute to the lack of 
transparency and difficulty in identifying the source of the overall gap 
between a firm’s book and taxable income.   
 
 We certainly see little value in conforming corporate taxation of 
options to book as a one-off project.  Where is the incremental value in 
firm X reporting a book/tax difference of $4 billion post options 
conformity versus status quo reporting of a gap of $5 billion, $1 billion 
of which is readily attributable to option compensation?   
 
Moreover, to the extent that we are concerned with continued 
manipulation of option valuation for earnings purposes post-SFAS 
123R, enhanced disclosure and perhaps specification of the inputs into 
option pricing models would appear to be a relatively low cost 
corrective.  The incremental benefit of conformity does not seem equal 
to the cost of 1) forcing employees to accept grant date valuation of 
option compensation, 2) introducing the opportunity to game the tax 
deduction for options, and/or 3) introducing a distortion into the 
public/private decision as a result of differentiated option taxation. 
 
 On the other hand, we think it possible that the status quo could be 
improved upon by adjusting the accounting treatment of options to 
match that of stock appreciation rights.  This change would result in 
realization-based valuation for the purposes of accounting, employee 
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tax, employer tax, and executive compensation disclosure; and it would 
place a check on gaming option expense recognition.  However, we are 
concerned that this reform might drive a wedge between options and 
restricted stock.  Moreover, implementation requires that the FASB 
reverse course (perhaps unlikely) or that the SEC or Congress intervene 
(perhaps undesirable).  Given the potential unintended consequences and 
what we view as minimal concerns with equity compensation post-SFAS 
123R, we do not see a strong driving force for departing from the status 
quo.  
